Banking regulation: Volcker vs. Basel

There’s additional chatter about financial regulatory reform today due to a luncheon speech that Paul Volcker’s giving on the subject. The debate continues to center around whether more stringent restrictions under the so-called Volcker Rule make sense, or whether capital requirements are a better way to go. The latter approach has some eloquent defenders, and seems to be favored by Asian and European regulators, but they should take heed of this new IMF study:

Using data for over 3,000 banks in 86 countries, we find that neither the overall index of BCP [Basel Core Principles on capital requirements] compliance nor its individual components are robustly associated with bank risk measured by Z-scores. We also fail to find a relationship between BCP compliance and systemic risk measured by a system-wide Z score.

And the band plays on…with each passing day it becomes more doubtful that something constructive will be done before the next financial crisis unfolds.

URLs:

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1081.pdf

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy.

Poor auctions signifying…what exactly?

A good deal is being made of subpar Treasury auctions this past week and whether they signify a turning point in the market’s appetite for U.S. government debt. It’s certainly possible, but we suspect that there’s a more nuanced and global explanation.

First off, a 10 year Treasury yielding almost 4% annually does not look like a bad deal given the intermediate growth outlook in the U.S., despite what so many other pundits are saying (unless you believe that we’re on the verge of persistent domestic inflation, i.e., a widespread USD surplus…anyone?).

Second, if Treasury auction participants came to market with only cash and held no other assets, then the prevailing theory would be harder to refute. However, the most important participants in treasury auctions are the New York Fed’s primary dealer banks, which are divisions of BNP, Bank of America, Barclays, Cantor, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Daiwa, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Jefferies, JP Morgan, Mizuho, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, RBC, RBS, and UBS. These bank divisions and their parents already own large amounts of financial assets. Thus, they also need to manage risk when making purchase commitments. And one of the biggest risks of the past week was whether the Eurozone could agree on an assistance plan for Greece.

The following members of the Fed’s primary dealer banks are also primary dealers for Greek debt: Barclay’s, BNP, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Merill Lynch (assumedly this is Bank of America), Morgan Stanley, Nomura, RBS, and UBS. This provides just a glimpse of the overall mosaic, as dealers also act as agents or conduits for public, and not just principals. However, it’s an important one, and it’s reported (and reasonable to assume) that several of them do own large slugs of Greek government debt.

Thus, given the uncertainty surrounding management of Greece’s funding crisis, and how it spiked again this past week as Germany dug in its heels, it’s quite possible that some of the usual buyers of U.S. Treasury debt are simply distracted and/or increasingly risk averse (even using low central bank interest rates to finance the purchase of protective credit default swaps, which probably offered more comfort in the immediate environment than new Treasuries).

 Consider, for example, that French and German banks are believed to be exposed to $119B of Greek debt. Assuming sane leverage ratios of 10x (a dangerous assumption to make), the potential financial loss is equivalent to a significant percentage of the two countries’ annual GDP of $6T (e.g., a 15% decline in the value of Greek bond holdings, if unhedged, would equal roughly 3% of combined French and German GDP).

As tempting as the U.S.-Treasury-on-the-brink hypothesis is for the public debt Cassandras, we think ours does a better job of incorporating the sharp strengthening of the USD over the past week, and market behavior since yet another agreement began to take shape.

Combined with the fact that speculative credit markets are looking awfully frothy, some other strange market signs, and the likelihood of federal fiscal consolidation in 2011, we think you have a recipe for an eventual rally in Treasuries. It reminds us a little bit of the post 9/11 Treasury market selloff. Caveat venditor?

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: The author does not own shares of any companies mentioned. Clients of the firm own shares of ALBKY, SHY, TLT, MFG, and NBG. A principal of the firm owns shares of C, GS, and MS. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy.

URLs:

http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html

http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Markets/HDAT/DispItem.aspx?Item_ID=3220&List_ID=1af869f3-57fb-4de6-b9ae-bdfd83c66c95

http://www.businessinsider.com/germany-will-have-to-become-greeces-abu-dhabi-since-way-too-many-foreigners-hold-greek-debt-2010-1

http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/banks-bet-greece-defaults-on-debt-they-helped-hide/

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703798904575069712153415820.html

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/cbuilder?ticker1=DXY%3AIND

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-27/bunds-fall-greek-bonds-rise-after-eu-leaders-agree-aid-plan.html

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJZgGddV4mIY

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/03/24/185091/new-negative-territory/

Crisis, regulation, vigilance & cynicism

A cynical take on Sen. Dodd’s financial regulatory reform bill by Matt Koppenheffer for Motley Fool:

We can probably point to plenty of regulatory failures in the lead-up to the financial crisis. But I hardly think that they’re regulatory failures stemming from lack of regulators. As Valukas noted in his report, regulators were swarming on Lehman well before its collapse…

It seems to me that the issue never was whether there were people trying to address the problem, but rather that they were trying to regulate on a fuzzy mandate of not letting something bad happen within the bounds of a very permissive system. For the same reason that we have speed limit signs posted in our residential neighborhoods, we need to give regulators a clearer, tougher set of standards that they can impose on financial companies.

First and foremost, those standards need to address the lunatic business model that Lehman Brothers — and, really, most of the big financial companies — was operating on at the time of its demise.

Specifically, Lehman was increasingly building up large, illiquid, proprietary investments while primarily financing itself through very short-term agreements. What it became was a massive, teetering Jenga game right smack in the middle of our financial system that could be toppled in the blink of an eye if it lost the confidence of major counterparties…

That last paragraph echoes a beautiful turn of phrase by Bill Bernstein in the most recent Financial Analysts Journal, in which he refers to ”leveraging so unstable that it could not survive the slightest of economic breezes, let alone a 100-year storm.”

Koppenheffer continues:

…the bill includes the Volcker Rule the way Cocoa Puffs include well-balanced nutrition. Little actually gets implemented in the text of the bill. Rather, specific regulations are supposed to come from a study on the rule’s potential impact. Not only is this likely to maximize the squishiness of the eventual rules, but it also gives lobbyists plenty of time to work their magic.

In the end, I don’t see the Fed folks as a bunch of incompetent bumblers. But when it comes to smothering the next Lehman, Fannie Mae…or AIG…I do think they’ll fail miserably because they’re being given a butter knife to regulate with when what they need is a buzzsaw.

A tangential riff: If we aren’t going to impose a hard, fast cap on leverage and other risky behaviors, then perhaps the power of network effects and private sector vigilance (vigilantism?) can help fill the gaps in our financial regulatory structure. For example, it seems reasonable to expect (OK, hope) that the next Harry Markopolos will be taken more seriously.

But when the issue is not fraud by a single market participant, but rather systemic levels of leverage and risk, then it seems unlikely that any kind of enforcement powers could be brought to bear if regulatory bodies haven’t purposefully enlisted private sector assistance beforehand. 

I suppose we’re a bit cynical too.  

URLs:

http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/03/24/why-the-fed-will-fail.aspx

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553816

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_vigilantism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Markopolos

Paging Doctrinaire Katsenelson

We might have found a fellow traveller on our lonely wing nut sojourn! Value investing maven Vitaliy Katsenelson has put his Capitalist Pig Party membership on the line in calling for tighter government regulation of the financial sector:

…at the risk of been kicked out of the Capitalistic Pig Party, I support tighter regulation of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) institutions…  

Lack of tight regulation in the TBTF space leads to the worst economic system of all: asymmetric socialism. Enormous gains are reaped by employees and shareholders, but losses are socialized and paid for by taxpayers.  That is simply immoral. 

It’s a well written piece and definitely recommended. Nothing in it about public debt hysteria, so there’s limited confirmation bias available to us. Still, it’s good to see that Vitaliy’s  not a slave to dogma.

If his party does exile him, perhaps we can commiserate over Northern Lights somewhere in ‘New Siberia’ (I might even try to change his mind about hamburgers).

URLs:

http://contrarianedge.com/2010/01/29/even-capitalist-pigs-should-love-bank-regulation/

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1119401/index.htm

http://contrarianedge.com/2009/06/07/the-making-of-capitalistic-pig-expanded/

Volatility? Shocking!

The news flow this week has put equity markets into one of their periodic panics. It’s been almost a year since the last one, so in the long term, this might be healthy. Healthy or not, it’s peculiar how closely these shakeouts have coincided with the political calendar, and judging by available academic research, the market should be better prepared for air pockets like the current one. For example, according to a 1997 study by Lamb et al:

Almost the entire advance in the [stock] market since 1897 corresponds to the periods when Congress is in recess. This is an impressive result, given that Congress is in recess about half as long as in session. Furthermore, average daily returns when Congress is not meeting are almost thirteen times greater than when Congress is in session. Throughout the year, cumulative returns during recess are eight times that experienced while Congress is in session. [emphasis added]

Or this 2006 study by Michael Ferguson and H. Douglas Witte:

We find a strong link between Congressional activity and stock market returns that persists even after controlling for known daily return anomalies. Stock returns are lower and volatility is higher when Congress is in session. This “Congressional Effect” can be quite large—more than 90% of the capital gains over the life of the DJIA have come on days when Congress is out of session. The Effect varies systematically with the public’s opinion of Congress: returns are lower and volatility higher when a relatively unpopular Congress is active. Public opinion appears to play a fundamental role in market prices. This is consistent with a mood-based explanation that sees Congress as ‘depressing’ the average investor. Alternatively, our results can also be reconciled with rational explanations that view Congressional activity as a proxy for regulatory uncertainty or rent-seeking behavior. [emphasis added]

Federal policies have a powerful effect on asset prices, and risk aversion has been very low until this week. With Congress back in town, the President on the war path, and widespread gnashing of teeth and rending of garments over budget deficits and the federal debt, volatility had nowhere to go but up. Our advice? Don’t worry about it (too much). It would be great if our elected leaders inspired more confidence and certainty, but political noise happens — the current bout might even need to happen in order to get satisfactory regulatory reforms enacted. However, we have one of the best (if not the best) political systems for correcting political errors. 

The big question ahead of us is how closely we’ll skirt a 1937 outcome, which shouldn’t be a material risk until 2011-12. The Treasury yield curve will probably provide the best clues. If longer term yields come down considerably in 2010, watch out. 

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. 

URLs:

http://www.unf.edu/~rlamb/Docs/FinServRev.pdf

http://www.fma.org/Orlando/Papers/Congress_and_the_Stock_Market.pdf

Between a ‘Derm and a Donkey

=====

2010.01.14  MEA CULPA – The following entry was based on a news report that mislabeled bank assets (loans, credit) as liabilities (deposits, capital). That’s a common mistake — most people would tend to think of money that someone else put into their care as an “asset”. After reading the FT’s front page story on the proposed bank levy, we note that it’s designed to be applied to exactly the kinds of assets that helped to precipitate the financial crisis. We therefore apologize for calling it a joke, and for the other aspersions we cast in its direction (see below). Our initial assessment was obviously wrong. It might not be a bad idea, and perhaps the Obama administration has taken the position that it will be easier to administer than tighter capital requirements; or perhaps the threat of the tax is being used as leverage in tightening long term capital requirements.  However…

(1) A fifteen basis point haircut on typical investment bank returns, especially if nothing is done about the leverage that can be employed, is awfully skimpy;  

(2) There are still risks in who will actually bear the cost;

(3) the activities of investment banks actually do some social good, believe it or not;

(4) The President and Congress are still more like Herbert Hoover than FDR/JFK/RR; and

(5) We’re still stuck between ‘Derms and Dems for the foreseeable future.

=====

In our latest Idle Speculator, we asserted that in the years ahead, the U.S. economy was likely to remain stuck between a pachyderm and a donkey. If today’s events are any indication, it’s a good call. President Obama called for a punitive tax on large banks, and the only Republican response we’ve heard so far is from a Congresswoman who mostly railed against public spending. In our view, both sides continue to make little if any sense. 

President Obama’s bank tax would apply only to institutions with $50B or more in assets, and the rate would be 15 basis points (0.15%). However, the levy would not be on bank income, but rather on banks’ liabilities, i.e., deposits. What does this mean? We’d need to take a closer look once legislation is drafted, but based on what’s been said, here’s our initial impression:

First, the large banks aren’t going to pay a damn thing. Depositors (savers) are simply going to take a 0.15% haircut on the interest rate they receive, all else equal. Essentially, this will just act as an additional tax on people who deposit funds with large banks, and/or as a marginal incentive to deposit funds with other institutions.

Second, it won’t do anything to prevent the systemic leverage and boneheaded risk taking that got us into this mess. Systemic fragility arises when banks create too many assets (by extending credit) relative to their liabilities and capital. If the government wanted to prevent this through taxation rather than regulation (probably a bad idea to begin with), then it should be taxing bank assets. Of course, even then, it would simply mean that debtors’ interest rates would go up by the amount of the tax…which means the banks still wouldn’t pay a damn thing (refer back to point one).

In his remarks, the President said:

“My determination to achieve this goal is only heightened when I see reports of massive profits and obscene bonuses at the very firms who owe their continued existence to the American people who have not been made whole, and who continue to face real hardship in this recession…”

As in his recent comments on the jobs situation, the President shot well wide of the mark. While it’s reportedly an attempt to marshall populist support by attacking a particulary unpopular industry, the approach is a joke (as supporting evidence, we’d point out that Financials are the third best performing sector in the S&P 500 today, and that Money Center and Regional Banks are among the best performing industries within it). 

We can only infer that of late, the President has been listening to the very worst strategists in his Cabinet, folks who would recommend Herbert Hoover’s approach to economic crisis and recovery over FDR’s (or JFK’s or Reagan’s if you prefer) at a time when the latter’s is far more appropriate. Obama’s current hawkishness is evident in the AP article:

Obama said he was determined that every dollar spent from the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program to rescue Wall Street firms, auto companies and mortgage holders is either repaid or paid for in some fashion.

His party’s hawkishness is also evident in the continuing failure to extend the COBRA subsidy under ARRA (a cynic might infer that this is intended to garner more support for heath care reform, but it’s a hawkish action either way). Thus, despite all the talk on the right and among tea party goers about “tax and spend liberals”, the reality looks quite different to us. The American electorate continues to be presented with only two choices — revenue hawks and budget hawks, i.e., higher taxes or lower spending – and those are essentially flip sides of the same coin.

In any case, forcing depositors to take a haircut, forcing debtors to pay marginally higher interest rates, or recovering every single dollar issued under TARP will do nothing to remedy the real hardships being faced by the American people in this recession. It also does nothing to prevent another financial crisis. If the President really wants to accomplish something on those counts, here are a few suggestions:

• Push hard for focused, meaningful financial regulatory reforms that will prevent excessive systemic fragility.
• Use the federal government’s creditworthiness and risk taking capacity to provide more direct assistance (i.e., employment) to the underemployed. 
• Stop being so terrified of budget deficits. Thinking about structural deficits is OK, but acting now to solve them could actually make the problem worse (ask Japan).
• Let private sector intermediaries (banks) use a historically steep yield curve to continue repairing their balance sheets by financing public deficits.
• If you insist on attacking TARP recipients, target the agents who control them (e.g., executive compensation or bonuses above a certain level), not owners, depositors, and borrowers.
• Enact policy measures that lower uncertainty, raise optimism, and thus increase the private demand for credit and investment.

You might also demand some accountability from whichever advisors had the most influence over today’s statement and last Friday’s…

URLs:

http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20100112.pdf

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100114/ap_on_bi_ge/us_obama_bank_fees

http://biz.yahoo.com/p/

http://biz.yahoo.com/p/4conameu.html

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-cobra-arra.html

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a025fd26-00ad-11df-ae8d-00144feabdc0.html

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/01/14/126481/the-back-of-the-envelope-bank-levy/

Rubin to the Rescue?

In Newsweek, former Goldman Sachs CEO, Clinton Treasury Secretary, and Citigroup bigwig Robert Rubin offers his analysis of the Great Recession and proposed nostrums for preventing another:

Given my views as to the causes of the crisis, I would recommend the following:

• There should be greatly increased capital and margin requirements for derivatives and other instruments of financial engineering to create a greater cushion when trouble develops and to reduce risk exposure. I developed this view during my many years of working with derivatives before entering government, as described in my 2003 book, In an Uncertain World.
• Standard derivative contracts should trade on an exchange to increase transparency. Transactions that are custom designed would not be exchange traded but would be subject to the same capital and margin requirements as listed transactions. Disclosure requirements could be considered for customized transactions, to provide private counterparties and regulators with the transparency to understand the risks.
• There should be two sets of more stringent leverage limitations for systemically significant institutions, one defined by risk-based models and the second by much simpler measures, since mathematical models can’t capture the full range of real-world possibilities.
• There should be significant constraints on off-balance-sheet financing; for example, institutions must retain ownership of a portion of off-balance-sheet assets.
• We need a change in accounting systems to avoid the artificial effects of mark-to-market accounting for illiquid assets on balance sheets and on markets. There are other accounting approaches that would better reflect long-run values for these assets.
• We should also provide effective mechanisms for dealing with systemically important nonbank financial institutions—including bank holding companies—that get into trouble, to mitigate “too big to fail” concerns, but practical ways to do this need to be developed.
• There should be greatly increased protections, both to safeguard consumers and to reduce systemic risk. The elements should include readily understandable disclosure, suitability requirements, prohibition of practices or instruments inherently susceptible to abuse, and, if some practical way can be found, personalized advice for the most vulnerable consumers.

Fair enough, mostly no brainers, but is Rubin being disingenuous? As we’ve previously written, there seem to be growing threats to to the man’s political capital, particularly within the Democratic party. And judging by this piece from Marshall Auerback, those threats still exist, and have intensified since 2006:

As one of the people whose policies threw the global economy off the rails, Rubin may be uniquely qualified to provide solutions as to how to get the economy back on track. But that would presuppose that the man actually acknowledged mistakes (as some of his other Goldman Sachs/Clinton Administration colleagues, such as Gary Gensler, have done) and displayed at least a marginal understanding of where he went wrong.

No such luck. We get the usual self-serving “nobody could have possibly predicted a crisis of this magnitude” right at the start…

Auerback cites a damning interview with the former head of the CFTC, Brooksley Born (a position now held by the aforementioned Gary Gensler):

…as analysts sort out the origins of what has become the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, Born has emerged as a sort of modern-day Cassandra. Some people believe the debacle could have been averted or muted had Greenspan and others followed her advice.As chairperson of the CFTC, Born advocated reining in the huge and growing market for financial derivatives.

According to Auerback:

Rubin now suggests that Born’s problem was one of style, rather than substance: she, being “too confrontational”, risked aborting any politically feasible reform of OTC derivatives. That’s certainly an interesting reinterpretation of Rubin’s actual role as Treasury Secretary, during which he laid the groundwork for today’s crisis through an aggressive championing of financial deregulation. It’s hard to think of one instance where the former Goldman Sachs CEO actually came down hard on his former Wall Street colleagues. Had he at least acknowledged some remorse or recognition of error, he would be more appropriately suited for an advisory role on how to fix the global economy, much as a reformed criminal often has useful insights on penal reform.No such luck here. If being one of the worst Treasury Secretaries ever wasn’t enough, Rubin left another unfortunate legacy at Citigroup, where he was a senior advisor after he quit the Treasury. He left Citi just before its near collapse amidst criticism of his performance. A distinguishing moment of his tenure was when Rubin got hold of Peter Fisher in the US Treasury Department to try to put pressure on the bond-rating agencies to avoid downgrading Enron’ debt which was a debtor of Citigroup…

Letting him publicly expound on getting the global economy back on track is akin to providing Kim Il Jong-il a public platform on human rights. Unlike Greenspan, who at least admitted mistakes, Rubin expects to be taken seriously as a policy maker despite acknowledging zero responsibility for the debacle that threw millions of Americans into unemployment. People around the world have lost their jobs, savings, and more largely thanks to the policies championed by this misguided deficit warrior.

Ouch.

We’ll pile on by reminding people that as Treasury Secretary, Rubin presided over implementation of the “strong dollar” policy designed by his predecessor, Lloyd Bentsen, which had damaging effects on many developing nations’ economies. He’s also featured prominently in a recent list at Motley Fool of “The 10 Dumbest Banker Quotes of All Time”. And we agree with Auerback that a sincere mea culpa for past errors, whether at Treasury or Citigroup, would buy the man some badly needed goodwill. We think he should also expand his bullet points to include the following: 

• Let’s not repeat the mistake of believing that experts always know best.
• Let’s agree that optimal outcomes often require more than just unbridled private actors.
• Let’s resolve not to get caught up in any more cults of personality, whether adorer or adoree.

Update 01/07/2010 (via Mark Thoma) – Larry Summers, who is currently President Obama’s National Economic Council chief, and was Robert Rubin’s protege and eventual successor at the Clinton Treasury, also finds his political capital under attack from both the left and the right.   

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURE: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a member of the Amazon Associates program, and earns a revenue sharing fee of approximately 4% on qualified purchases made by clicking through from our website.

URLs:

http://www.newsweek.com/id/225623/page/2

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0375757309?ie=UTF8&tag=symmetrycapit-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0375757309

http://www.newdeal20.org/?p=7270

http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2009/marapr/features/born.html

http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2009/11/25/the-10-dumbest-banker-quotes-of-all-time.aspx

http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2010.01.03/880.html

http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/bruce-bartlett/1373/summers-out

Carbon, Risk, & Uncertainty

Interesting guest blog at HBR by Bob Lurie on the risks and uncertainties posed by carbon taxation, and their importance to all businesses and business strategy:

While the US Government is working on the fine print of a new carbon regulatory system, one thing is clear: we are all going to face a new tax. It’s important that business leaders avoid the mistake of thinking this will be a new burden assessed on just a few, like the chemical industry and power utilities. Carbon is ubiquitous — part of every industry, and indeed, every human activity — from pharmaceuticals to farming to family field trips. This tax is inescapable, yet where and how hard it will hit is very hard to predict.

…[It is] essential that you view this new carbon economy not as a set of regulations you need to follow, but as an opportunity to separate yourself from those who don’t understand the implications of the new rules as well as you do.

This is about competitiveness, not compliance. Understanding the implications is a strategic imperative. And because the changes are going to be big, the time is now to develop your strategic intent and prepare for a new operational playbook.

…Let’s agree that the rationale for reducing carbon is critically important. But let’s also acknowledge the effects on business will produce outcomes that feel arbitrary and unfair.

There are big changes ahead. It will take a while for the new carbon rules to go into effect, and for businesses as well as regulators to figure out their full implications. But the impacts are large enough so that you should use this grace period to assess how the carbon tax will influence your strategy. If you take too long to move, you may get buried.

URLs:

http://blogs.hbr.org/leadinggreen/2009/07/carbon-taxes-unpredictable-impact.html

Dog Kisses, Wolf Vomit, and Investing

Our quote of the day is taken from a Time article about cutting edge research into canine cognition and behavior:

“If we happened to spit up whatever we just ate, I don’t think our dogs would be upset at all.”

The gist of the quote is found in the following passage:

The first rule for scientists studying dogs is, Don’t trust your hunches. Just because a dog looks as if it can count or understand words doesn’t mean it can. “We say to owners, Look, you may have intuitions about your dog that are valuable,” says Hauser. “But they might be wrong.”

Take for instance the kiss a dog gives you when you come home. It looks like love, but it could also be hunger. Wolves also lick one another’s mouths, particularly when one wolf returns to the pack. They can use their sense of taste and smell to see if the returnee has caught some prey on its journey. If it did, the licking often prompts it to vomit up some of that kill for the other members of the pack to share. The kiss dogs give us probably evolved from this inspection.

Believe it or not, this example is relevant to investing, finance, economics, politics, and pretty much every other human endeavor, as it nicely illustrates the gaps that can exist between beliefs, perceptions, and reality. When we interact with a dog, we can’t prevent ourselves from thinking human thoughts, thoughts that are also deeply embedded in our biological and cultural backgrounds. That means that for most of us, when another person kisses us excitedly about the face and mouth, they are demonstrating the affection they feel for us (though sometimes it’s other emotions, as Fredo Corleone could attest). And in most cases, that’s probably what the other person is thinking too. But apparently that might not have any resemblance to what a dog is thinking when it “kisses” you. Nonetheless, we tend to believe it is a “kiss”, primarily because receiving affection, real or perceived, makes us feel good. But it’s an interpretation that is probably not well grounded in reality.

In the investing world, decisions and behaviors are not always grounded in a solid assessment of reality either. For example, while it might have felt better to sell risky assets in February or March of this year and be done with it, the reality is that it would have imposed a severe performance cost (to this point, anyways). Likewise, it feels good to own assets that are in popular demand, like homes from 2003-2006, tech stocks from 1998-2000, and so on. The overwhelming use of “momentum” indicators in the investing business indicates that the majority of professional investors are prone to the same kinds of mistakes. While the continuing prevalence of herding behavior in financial markets might be comforting to individual members of the herd at most times, it’s almost certain to cause episodes of significant harm.

Studies of successful investors and traders have found that while they experience the same emotions and discomfort as every other person dealing with risk and uncertainty, they have developed skills that allow them to manage emotions with reason and discipline. Specifically, they have a firm grasp of the fact that they are involved in a probabilistic endeavor that may not turn out well in every case, and they apply consistent decision making processes, even when it would feel better to run the other way. While you may never need to develop the ice water veins of a successful trader, or the steely nerves of a contrarian investor,  there are a couple of old adages that, because they are well grounded in reality, should help all investors avoid excessive reliance on emotion when making financial decisions:

What goes up must (eventually) come down.

Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.

Of course, in the world of human-canine relations, it probably won’t cause any harm to believe that a dog kiss is, well, just a kiss. It sure beats the alternative!

URLs:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1921614,00.html?xid=yahoo-feat

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcFlp6kl508&feature=player_embedded

DISCLAIMER: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a Pennsylvania registered investment advisor. The foregoing is not a solicitation to buy or sell any security, or a recommendation to engage in any particular investment strategy.

The first rule for scientists studying dogs is, Don’t trust your hunches. Just because a dog looks as if it can count or understand words doesn’t mean it can. “We say to owners, Look, you may have intuitions about your dog that are valuable,” says Hauser. “But they might be wrong.” See TIME’s video “The New Frugality: Doggie Day Care.”

Take for instance the kiss a dog gives you when you come home. It looks like love, but it could also be hunger. Wolves also lick one another’s mouths, particularly when one wolf returns to the pack. They can use their sense of taste and smell to see if the returnee has caught some prey on its journey. If it did, the licking often prompts it to vomit up some of that kill for the other members of the pack to share. The kiss dogs give us probably evolved from this inspection. “If we happened to spit up whatever we just ate,” says Horowitz, “I don’t think our dogs would be upset at all.”The first rule for scientists studying dogs is, Don’t trust your hunches. Just because a dog looks as if it can count or understand words doesn’t mean it can. “We say to owners, Look, you may have intuitions about your dog that are valuable,” says Hauser. “But they might be wrong.” See TIME’s video “The New Frugality: Doggie Day Care.”

Take for instance the kiss a dog gives you when you come home. It looks like love, but it could also be hunger. Wolves also lick one another’s mouths, particularly when one wolf returns to the pack. They can use their sense of taste and smell to see if the returnee has caught some prey on its journey. If it did, the licking often prompts it to vomit up some of that kill for the other members of the pack to share. The kiss dogs give us probably evolved from this inspection. “If we happened to spit up whatever we just ate,” says Horowitz, “I don’t think our dogs would be upset at all.”The first rule for scientists studying dogs is, Don’t trust your hunches. Just because a dog looks as if it can count or understand words doesn’t mean it can. “We say to owners, Look, you may have intuitions about your dog that are valuable,” says Hauser. “But they might be wrong.” See TIME’s video “The New Frugality: Doggie Day Care.”

Take for instance the kiss a dog gives you when you come home. It looks like love, but it could also be hunger. Wolves also lick one another’s mouths, particularly when one wolf returns to the pack. They can use their sense of taste and smell to see if the returnee has caught some prey on its journey. If it did, the licking often prompts it to vomit up some of that kill for the other members of the pack to share. The kiss dogs give us probably evolved from this inspection. “If we happened to spit up whatever we just ate,” says Horowitz, “I don’t think our dogs would be upset at all.”

Economies & Earthquakes

What do economies and earthquakes have in common? Plenty, as a recent essay from McKinsey reminds us (registration required):

…scientists in the field of complexity theory argue that earthquakes, forest fires, power blackouts, and the like are extremely difficult or even impossible to foresee because they are the products of many interdependent “agents” and cascades of events in inherently unstable systems that generate large variations. One symptom of such a system’s behavior is that the frequency and magnitude of outcomes can be described by a mathematical relationship called a “power law,” characterized by a short “head” of frequently occurring small events, dropping off to a long “tail” of increasingly rare but much larger ones. The power law phenomenon, explored in recent bestselling books and observed by academics for decades, seems to be applicable to a wide range of currently relevant economic outcomes, including financial crises, industrial production, and corporate bankruptcies.

Among those bestselling books is Benoit Mandelbrot’s semi-autobiographical The (Mis)Behavior of Markets. Mandelbrot is notable for pointing out (since the early 1960s) that “high odds of catastrophic price changes” have always existed in financial markets due to what he has termed “wild randomness”. And power laws, which describe the inordinate impact of outsized events, were one of the foundations upon which his work was built. His first exposure to them was through a paper that documented the relative frequency of certain words, and later through the work of classical Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto on income distributions (Pareto’s work is the basis of the so-called “80/20 Rule“).

Despite knowing about power laws and distributions for many decades, their importance to markets and economies has only recently gotten much attention. Whether this attention persists, or fades into complacency as it has following earlier crises, remains to be seen. If the former, the McKinsey essay suggests five principles to follow as our knowledge of complex systems evolves:

These examples indicate that power law patterns, with their small, frequent outcomes mixed with rare, hard-to-predict extreme ones, exist in many aspects of the economy. This suggests that the economy, like other complex systems characterized by power law behavior, is inherently unstable and prone to occasional huge failures. Intriguing stuff, but how can corporate strategists, economists, and policy makers use it? This is still a young field of research, and the study of power law patterns may be part of the answer, but it isn’t too early to consider and discuss potential implications.

Make the system the unit of analysis…

Don’t assume stability and do take a long look back…

Focus on early warning…

Build flexible business models…

Learn from scientists studying other complex systems…

The Treasury’s recent “stress tests” of major banks is an example of risk management based on complexity theory. Unfortunately, there’s plenty of skepticism about how they were carried out, which could imply that complacency is already taking hold of the financial system, only nine months after the collapse of Lehman.

URLs:

http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Strategy/Globalization/Power_curves_What_natural_and_economic_disasters_have_in_common_2376

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124182311010302297.html