International time machine investing

Neat article on country selection by Dan Richards, who recently asked an audience how they would allocate their equity investments in 1970 between Australia, Canada, Europe, Hong Kong, Japan, and the U.S. if they had a time machine. The responses and the data are pretty interesting. Richards’ key observations capture some timeless lessons for investors:

1. When looking at returns, don’t overlook volatility.
2. Beware the cognitive bias caused by ’recency effects’.
3. Avoid extrapolation bias.
4. Understand the impact of currency rates; for example, over 20% of Europe’s outperformance versus the U.S. was due to exchange rate effects (the currency adjusted returns for Japan are even more dramatic — 74% by our calculations!).
5. The recent “lost decade” for equity investors has been largely a U.S. phenomenon.
6. Look before you leap; i.e., do your homework, base your decisions on evidence and data and not just feelings and opinions, and so on.

URLs:

http://www.advisorperspectives.com/newsletters10/pdfs/Lessons_from_an_Investing_Time_Machine.pdf 

http://www.theundergroundinvestor.com/2006/11/a-today-a-lesson-in-investment-psychology-101/

http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page66?oid=199249&sn=Detail

Masters of the Universe: They’re baaaack…

A new BIS paper has some very telling data points. First, they demonstrate the extent to which leveraged financial speculation drove foreign currency movements in the financial crisis (it’s quite reasonable to assume that this factor was at work in other asset class dislocations too). Second, it provides evidence that highly leveraged masters of the universe were back to their old tricks in fairly short order.

Let’s start with a  quick primer on “carry trades.”  A carry trade occurs when a financial market participant borrows in some currency with a low nominal interest rate (the “funding currency”) and invests the loan proceeds in some asset(s) (a “target asset”) that’s expected to appreciate at a rate that exceeds the interest rate due on the borrowed currency. The target asset can be a higher yielding currency, a credit instrument, equities or a stock market proxy, commodities or a commodity index proxy, and so on.

The Yen carry trade — borrowing low yielding Japanese Yen and using them to acquire riskier assets – has been increasingly employed by speculators since the 1990s, and appears to have played a key role in the speculative period of 2004-2008.

Speculators engaging in this activity are taking risks (sometimes massive risks) with (for the most part) Other People’s Money (OPM). When it works, they return the borrowed funding currency plus interest, and pocket the difference. When it goes terribly wrong, you wind down operations and hide from your creditors behind a corporate liability shield, forcing them to write down the value of their loans to you (their funding currency assets).

Nice work if you can get it, and amazingly, investment banks and their subsidiaries have been falling all over themselves to make these loans to privileged clients — including their own proprietary desks and funds — since the late 1990s (in competitive strategy, herd pursuit of bad ideas is usually a sign of an over crowded industry).

Better yet for the carry traders, increasingly lax financial regulation has allowed speculators to lever their carry up to levels not seen before in modern history, meaning they can borrow more money for a given level of collateral, and/or purchase more assets with a given amount of funding currency.

As some of those trades started to go bad in 2008, the result was a breathtakingly sharp and sudden reversal in the key funding currency, the Yen. This can be seen in the circled graph below, along with the following observations:

• The rate of appreciation in the Yen was far greater in 2008 than in the 1997 and 1998 global financial crises. The left most graph shows foreign exchange movements between the Yen and thirty three other currencies during the Asian crisis of 1997. Clearly, forex movements in that crisis were country specific.
• The middle graph shows currency movements against the Yen during the 1998 crisis associated with the Russian sovereign debt default. The appearance of a positive slope is apparent, implying that forex dislocations were due more to speculative behaviors including the rising use of leverage than to country-specific risks (for that we can probably thank the pioneering geniuses at LTCM and their investment bank benefactors).
• The third graph shows the appreciation of the Yen during the recent global financial crisis. The slope, which gives an idea of how sharply the Yen appreciated against those 33 other currencies, is breathtaking. The median interest rate on the target currencies (on the horizontal axis) also appears to have been roughly half of what it was in 1998.

Translating into English, this means that in 2008-09, the Yen appreciated even more sharply than it did in 1998, and against target assets that offered half the expected return of those in 1998. This calls to mind a question we raised recently, which is whether some powerful financial market participants are confusing ”efficient dislocation” with “market efficiency.” That would be understandable after all. History shows that the fatter the economic rents being justified, the more deluded the economic rationales tend to be.

In the BIS paper, the author also notes that carry trade activities are inherently pro-cyclical: borrowing activity tends to push down the market value of the funding currency, while investing activity tends to push up the market value of the target assets, and this will tend to invite increasing levels of speculation until something causes a breakdown.

Higher degrees of leverage make the pro-cyclicality and the eventual fallout that much worse. Unfortunately, while a great deal has been made of John Maynard Keynes’ alleged return in the past year, it appears that the brief 2008-09 resurgence of Hyman Minsky — who warned presciently of such dangers – has already been forgotten.

That “Minsky fade” appears to be supported by the bottom right graph (though admittedly, this case isn’t as strong as the leveraged carry trade evidence discussed above). The negative slope in that graph shows that less than a year later, the Yen depreciated markedly against many currencies, especially against higher yielding target currencies, which runs counter to the aftermath of 1997 and 1998.

The implication is that the Yen carry trade came back on line fairly quickly after financial markets regained their footing. Apparently financial cockroaches are, like their arachnid namesakes, largely immune to the effects of fallout. As described by the BIS author:

…with extreme risk aversion abating, carry trade activity – a relatively risky strategy – may have returned in the second half of 2009. Indeed, carry trades in a number of high-yielding currencies, especially those of commodity exporters, provided extraordinarily high ex post returns over this period. Moreover, near zero interest rates prevailed in many major currencies, increasing ex ante profitability not only for traditional funding currencies such as the yen. Carry-to-risk ratios support this conclusion…

A a critically important aspect of this issue is financial regulatory reform. Very little has been done from a regulatory standpoint to bring down the astronomical leverage that was available for carry trade speculation prior to 2008. Yesterday, Larry Summers gave an interview to CNBC in which he emphasized that the scope of the proposed “Volcker Rule” was limited to particular types of banks.

If true, over leveraged areas of global financial markets are likely to continue escaping prudent regulation, which means that the pronounced cycles of euphoria and distress in risky asset classes will continue. While those swings create opportunities for contrarian investors, the dynamic behind them is a zero-sum or even net-negative economic game. In the long run, it causes more economic harm than it’s worth.

And while interest rates have converged substantially since the 1990s, current spreads are likely to persist in the decade ahead for multiple reasons, not least being variation in demographic cycles, which will mean lower nominal rates in most developed countries, and higher rates in most emerging markets.

In other words, the roach bait isn’t going anywhere soon. That means that sound regulation absolutely must fill the void in order for the gains from financial market speculation to approach something resembling a social optimum.

UPDATE 3/2/2010 – AP report on further progress in Senate Finance on financial regulation

URLs:

http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1003f.pdf?noframes=1

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2010/02/wsj-hedge-fund-career-trades/

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100302/ap_on_bi_ge/us_financial_overhaul

Career trades and object lessons

The WSJ carried an interesting story today (subscription required) about hedge fund bearishness on the euro relative to the USD (i.e., a falling euro exchange rate):

Some heavyweight hedge funds have launched large bearish bets against the euro in moves that are reminiscent of the trading action at the height of the U.S. financial crisis.

The big bets are emerging amid gatherings such as an exclusive “idea dinner” earlier this month that included hedge-fund titans SAC Capital Advisors LP and Soros Fund Management LLC. During the dinner, hosted by a boutique investment bank at a private townhouse in Manhattan, a small group of all-star hedge-fund managers argued that the euro is likely to fall to “parity”—or equal on an exchange basis—with the dollar…

Our interest isn’t motivated by the anti-euro call, which is rather conventional and uninteresting (Robert Mundell, one of the intellectual architects of the EMU, has recently predicted movement towards EUR-USD parity, and USD parity is something of an underlying objective of the EMU, if not the ECB).

Rather, it’s in the social and market dynamics involved, and how strongly they illuminate the ongoing importance of financial market regulatory reform.

The WSJ notes that this was an invitation-only event at a private home, and included some major global macro hedge fund players. While that’s not a bad thing per se, it definitely creates some potential market asymmetries and risks:

• Asymmetries to the extent that a small number of players with (relatively) massive amounts of capital and the ability to take highly leveraged bets (that’s the implication of “career trade”) may all be thinking and moving in the same direction; and
• Market and economic risks may because concerted, highly leveraged bets are likely to accelerate what might otherwise be a more orderly return to parity, i.e., one that unfolds over a longer period of time that allows for interested agents to adjust without too much trouble.

That last one is the more interesting point in our opinion, because of what it implies about the theoretical ideal of market efficiency. If EUR-USD is bound to return to parity, is it less destructive to let it “happen naturally”, or is it healthier in the long term to allow levered up speculators to (attempt to) correct mispricings as soon and as quickly as possible?

We have some qualms with the latter approach, because: (1) it may create more market and economic havoc than would otherwise occur; (2) if successful, the “rents” associated with the resulting dislocation (even beyond the mere price adjustment) accrue to a small number of privileged players; and (3) if those bets go badly, the damage could very well spread beyond the hedge funds’ assets (LTCM being the archetypal example).

Of course, those rents accrue to a hedge fund’s passive partners too, so there may be outside institutions that benefit, rather than just the funds’ general partners (emphasis on “may”). But speculators aren’t just messing with an asset class here; they’re impacting the very measuring rods of economic activity and financial obligations, and some of them are able to employ astronomical leverage in doing so, if they desire. 

If the net social costs of that activity are negative, it becomes immaterial who the ultimate beneficiaries of the managing partners’ actions are. It also highlights how critical it is to do regulatory reform well, but soon. Speculators are absolutely critical to financial markets and economies, but optimization requires some degree of financial constraint. How many more ‘object lessons’ will we require on that point?

URLs:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703795004575087741848074392.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Term_Capital_Management

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy.

Fiduciary churn

Ouch! Research by finance professor Scott Stewart finds that the decisions made by plan sponsors on behalf of pensions, endowments, and foundations have persistently negative economic value.  

Using the most conservative approach for interpreting his results, Stewart concluded that plan sponsors had collectively squandered $170 billion in value over the two-plus decades he studied… 

“Plan sponsors never make their money back,” Stewart told me. “If they simply went on vacation, they could save their clients $170 billion – and that doesn’t count transaction costs.” 

The good news for plan sponsors? They’re less bad than most:

Plan sponsors are, of course, not unique in their ability to destroy value in this manner. Numerous studies, including those by Dalbar and Morningstar, have documented that individual investors, for example, buy mutual funds more heavily at the market peak and tend to sell them at the market bottom.  Plan sponsors should be more sophisticated than individual investors and, according to Stewart, they are. “Although they behave like retail investors,” he said, “the amount of value they destroy is a fraction of that destroyed by individuals.”

URLs:  

http://www.advisorperspectives.com/newsletters10/pdfs/How_to_Squander_$170_Billion.pdf  

I’ll see your PAYGO and raise you a double dip

A key objective raised by President Obama in his state of the union address was to address the ‘fiscal hole’ of the federal government. His rationale was that “like any cash strapped family, we will work within a budget to invest in what we need and sacrifice what we don’t.” he asked Congress to reinstate PAYGO, which reportedly helped the federal government “record surpluses in the 1990s,” and advocated investing in people “without leaving them a mountain of debt.” He closed on this point by saying that it’s just common sense.

Culturally, these ideas resonate with Americans. And for a business or household, budget constraints are a matter of common sense (even though we don’t always adhere to them). But there is no budget constraint on a government that can create money, i.e., non-interest bearing debt, out of thin air. The only meaningful constraint to the level of non-interest bearing debt is inflation, which occurs when a government creates more money than the economy requires, causing its non-interest bearing debt to lose value against most goods and services. Thus, while it may score some political points (thanks to our primary educational system’s lack of a financial and economic curriculum?), it’s absurd for the president to embrace the common sense that households and businesses use in setting budgets. The federal government faces an entirely different kind of budget constraint.

Instead, given the government’s power to create money, common sense would hold that the amount of money supplied to the economy should be equal to the amount of money required by the economy (please note, this simplification is not an attempt to resurrect the policy prescriptions of old school monetarism). Thus, the proper approach to budgets at the federal level is to ask whether there is currently a surfeit or deficit of USDs in our economy. Given the number of private financial commitments that were entered into in the past decade, and dramatic declines in economic activity, it’s difficult to argue that there’s currently a surfeit of dollars. And if recent political rhetoric is any indication, dollars are likely to become scarcer in the years ahead (it would be ironic if, instead of inflation, deflation became the motivating force behind a move away from the USD as global reserve currency).

The president did set forth some positive ideas, such as a zero capital gains tax on small business investment, capital investment incentives for companies of all sizes, and infrastructure investment. Assuming these are financed at least in part by new money creation, they would help to prevent a renewed liquidity crunch. But to the extent that they are “offset” by cuts or freezes elsewhere in the name of closing fiscal gaps and filling in budget holes, or by higher taxes on other activities, the net short term effect on the economy will be nil or worse. And like Japan, we’ll be in for our second lost decade out of two. As we’ve pointed out, leaving future generations without a “mountain of debt” sometimes means leaving them with equivalent (or greater) opportunity costs. We should strive to avoid both of those outcomes. To do so, we have to rethink the cultural common sense that debt is always and everywhere to be avoided.

From an investing standpoint, if vigorous policy actions follow the path being laid out by the rhetoric and “common sense” emanating from so many quarters, then the USD will continue to strengthen, the real economy will stagnate or weaken further, and nominal asset values will fall for all but the highest grade government paper. In that scenario, we would be lucky to tread water and leave only 16% of the country underemployed.

Mr. President, I’ll see your PAYGO and raise you a double dip recession.

RELATED READING (file under confirmation bias): 

We’re well aware that our current view of things puts us shoulder to shoulder with some members of the “loony left”, but the macroeconomics of this stuff are fairly straightforward. Our lonely wing nut sojourn continues, placing us in lockstep with one Mr. Paul Krugman: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/obama-liquidates-himself/.

The Fed is seeking an exit strategy from its liquidity programs and low interest rate policy. The impact of that exit can be either muted or amplified by Congressional actions. If Congress becomes hawkish, there is no reason for the Fed to do so. If they both begin tightening, it’s hello 1937: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601015&sid=aXeUAV7_bz_o

An excellent idea from Warren Mosler — a full payroll tax holiday — that has yet to fall on the radar of federal policymakers: http://moslereconomics.com/2010/01/28/tea-party-plan-for-dems-cut-to-the-front-with-tax-cuts/. Here’s how Mosler describes the cause of poor economic policymaking: “…so-called economic experts have confused themselves and their political masters with contrived explanations for the way the economy works, and their limited vision has limited the range of policy choice. The result has been a monumental economic and social disaster caused by an obvious shortage of aggregate demand. The spending power needed to make mortgage payments, car payments, and do a bit of shopping- all of which would fix the economy and end the financial crisis- just isn’t there.”

Marshall Auerback writes that “Any kind of spending cuts in the middle of the worst recession since the Great Depression is insane.  What we are beginning to see is the return of Herbert Hoover and the ‘liquidationists.’” http://www.newdeal20.org/?p=7731

Ed Harrison posts an email exchange with Auerback, in which the latter wrote: “What the US government is now in danger of repeating is taking its economy down the fast track to a double-dip recession.  With investment still flat, consumers trying to increase their saving ratio and net exports making a negative contribution to growth – the President and his advisors evidently believe the persistently high unemployment is something the private sector has to deal with.”  http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/01/what-president-obama-can-do-to-improve-the-economy.html. As we’ve noted elsewhere, the demographic research of folks like John Geanakoplos, Diane Macunovich, and Ajay Kapur implies that for the next decade, the U.S. private sector is not going to behave as the baby boomer decades have conditioned us to expect. Hence the case for a more activist — and just as importantly, ’self-financing’ – public sector. ‘Self financing’ today means the Federal Reserve creating the dollars that enable primary dealer banks to absorb Treasury offerings at auction via direct bids.  For that process to continue, the federal government must continue to issue debt, rather than shoveling dirt on the people and institutions that are still near the bottom of our deep ’fiscal hole’.

Jonathan Zasloff writes (TOH Krugman) that “At some point someone must make an argument for government.” http://www.samefacts.com/2010/01/politics-and-leadership/obamas-self-inflicted-lobotomy-proceeds-apace/  Why are Democrats today so afraid to make that argument? Like the health care debacle, could the lessons learned in the Clinton years be ill suited to today? As for the GOP, our take is that by harping on government in all its forms (besides those forms that help favored firms and industries collect their share of rents from the rest of us, of course), Republicans leave the door open to the development of increasingly socialist policies. In fact, if our take on the state of the private sector in the coming decade is accurate, they will practically mandate it.

State unemployment insurance tracker at Pro Publica (TOH Credit Writedowns) shows how critical federal government support currently is for many states: http://projects.propublica.org/unemployment/

George Soros thinks that premature budget tightening could be bearish for gold prices: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/davos/7085504/Davos-2010-George-Soros-warns-gold-is-now-the-ultimate-bubble.html. Reminiscent of Jon Nadler’s argument last fall against gold: http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2009/11/a-gold-bears-comments/

Finally, in what might be a mirror image of our loney wing nut position, Bill Gross seems to be exhibiting a profound case of anti-Keynesianism: http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2010/February+2010+Gross+Ring+of+Fire.htm

Volatility? Shocking!

The news flow this week has put equity markets into one of their periodic panics. It’s been almost a year since the last one, so in the long term, this might be healthy. Healthy or not, it’s peculiar how closely these shakeouts have coincided with the political calendar, and judging by available academic research, the market should be better prepared for air pockets like the current one. For example, according to a 1997 study by Lamb et al:

Almost the entire advance in the [stock] market since 1897 corresponds to the periods when Congress is in recess. This is an impressive result, given that Congress is in recess about half as long as in session. Furthermore, average daily returns when Congress is not meeting are almost thirteen times greater than when Congress is in session. Throughout the year, cumulative returns during recess are eight times that experienced while Congress is in session. [emphasis added]

Or this 2006 study by Michael Ferguson and H. Douglas Witte:

We find a strong link between Congressional activity and stock market returns that persists even after controlling for known daily return anomalies. Stock returns are lower and volatility is higher when Congress is in session. This “Congressional Effect” can be quite large—more than 90% of the capital gains over the life of the DJIA have come on days when Congress is out of session. The Effect varies systematically with the public’s opinion of Congress: returns are lower and volatility higher when a relatively unpopular Congress is active. Public opinion appears to play a fundamental role in market prices. This is consistent with a mood-based explanation that sees Congress as ‘depressing’ the average investor. Alternatively, our results can also be reconciled with rational explanations that view Congressional activity as a proxy for regulatory uncertainty or rent-seeking behavior. [emphasis added]

Federal policies have a powerful effect on asset prices, and risk aversion has been very low until this week. With Congress back in town, the President on the war path, and widespread gnashing of teeth and rending of garments over budget deficits and the federal debt, volatility had nowhere to go but up. Our advice? Don’t worry about it (too much). It would be great if our elected leaders inspired more confidence and certainty, but political noise happens — the current bout might even need to happen in order to get satisfactory regulatory reforms enacted. However, we have one of the best (if not the best) political systems for correcting political errors. 

The big question ahead of us is how closely we’ll skirt a 1937 outcome, which shouldn’t be a material risk until 2011-12. The Treasury yield curve will probably provide the best clues. If longer term yields come down considerably in 2010, watch out. 

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. 

URLs:

http://www.unf.edu/~rlamb/Docs/FinServRev.pdf

http://www.fma.org/Orlando/Papers/Congress_and_the_Stock_Market.pdf

Wall Street Stuff

Barron’s cover story this weekend urges Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to stop punishing savers and raise the Fed’s target overnight interest rate. To support their case, they use an array of market indicators, including the US Dollar index and the USD price of gold, arguing that “big investors have come to see the dollar, commodities and stocks as one-way bets.” A dramatically titled sidebar of charts (‘The Perils of Easy Money’) is provided, but beyond the rising price of gold, there’s nothing in them that offers primae facie evidence of either easy money or impending inflation.  Yes, the USD has declined almost 15% from its peak, but at current levels it is simply back to where it was at the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008. And while the S&P 500 has had a breath taking run off of its March 09 lows, it’s still roughly 20% below its peak.

What’s more, there’s little about the real U.S. economy that argues for higher nominal interest rates, and inflation (and deflation) can only arise from a misalignment of the financial system with the real economy. There’s still a considerable amount of private sector debt to be worked out in the coming years and decades; excessive household consumption has run its course; and U.S. demographics do not imply a high or rising ‘natural‘ rate of interest in the decade ahead. In fact, based on that latter point, we can sympathize (out of context) with Milton Friedman’s 1965 claim that “we are all Keynesians now”, as research into population demographics and their effects on economic output and asset pricing has produced some powerful (if tentative) insights. At the present time, the U.S. is simply not at a point where, demographically speaking or policy-wise, a low nominal rate of interest on overnight reserves is likely to produce rising asset prices or “excess demand” for goods and services in the same way that it did in the late 1970s. And for that reason, increasing investment in public goods, as many of today’s policymakers advocate, might be a good idea. It might even be inevitable, judging by the experience of Japan, a country ten years ahead of us on the demographic curve. At the very least, we can hope it will be done well (Art Laffer penned a supply side refutation back in May but did not address his underlying assumptions of perfect competition for — and full employment of — real resources).

The real problem with a low Fed Funds target, as we have pointed out previously, is that the USD is still the world’s primary reserve currency. Thus, while a low Funds rate might be appropriate for the U.S. economy, it can have inflationary consequences in parts of the world that have higher expected growth rates (the reverse can also happen, as it did in the 1990s – while a high funds rate and a strong dollar seemed appropriate for the U.S. economy, they wreaked deflationary havoc on much of the world). Rising prices for goods that are globally traded, and thus subject to the Law of One Price, will feed back into domestic U.S. price levels, providing a noticeable whiff of stagflation, much as gold, precious metals, and other commodities are doing now.  The global pressures caused by an easy Fed are also going to cause plenty of political consternation and some financial dislocation abroad, as recent salvos from global trading partners over the USD attest to. But we don’t expect broader inflationary pressures to unfold in the U.S. for quite some time, nor do we expect Congress to even entertain the possibility of revisiting Humphrey Hawkins; which means, in our view, that the Fed will remain easy for some time, probably well into 2010. In the meantime, should the USD continue its current trajectory, we might see some coordinated global interventions, as we did with the Plaza and Louvre Accords in the mid-1980s. But in those episodes, national treasury departments played the lead roles, not central banks.

There are also a couple of Investment News articles that illuminate some of the beefs we have with our industry. The first one is on a Morningstar study that found that over half of all mutual fund managers have no money in their own funds. There are some legitimate reasons why a percentage of mutual fund managers would not own shares of their own fund — but that percentage should be waaaaay below 51%. That’s bad enough, but what really stuck in our craw was the speculation that some fund managers might have their money in separately managed accounts that follow a similar strategy as their mutual fund, as they tend to offer lower expenses (they also offer greater transparency, potential tax advantages, and opportunities for customization). If we ran our Opportunistic Portfolio as a mutual fund, our firm’s principals and employees would own it as a mutual fund, period. As it is, we only offer it as a separately managed account, because that is a more advantageous approach for most investors, and because technology has made it possible for us to offer separate accounts to all of our clients (it’s also a heck of a lot cheaper than forming a mutual fund). I know this stuff goes right over most of our clients’ heads when we try to explain it. Suffice to say, we’re trying to do right by them, and by our industry, on each and every day, and we appreciate stories like this one as they lend support to a key piece of our competitive strategy.

The second article is somewhat innocuous, but offers a glimpse into the prevalence of momentum trading in our business, and the general fascination with market momentum. It quotes a large cap manager at ING as saying that ”There does seem to be something unorthodox about [current equity market behavior], but you ignore it at your own peril.” That’s not an objectionable statement, but the article’s headline was a bit stronger: “Market rebound may be illogical, but ‘ignore it at your own peril,’ manage of $1.7B warns”. Surely a similar thought occurred to each of the 20,000 bison shepherded off of Vore over the eons:

[The site hosting that image is pretty neat - you can read a history of bison and horses on the Great Plains while authentic cowboy/saloon music plays in the background.]

Our beef with momentum investing is that it rationalizes away everything but herd direction. If a manager buys momentum because the underlying investment thesis makes sense, there’s nothing wrong with that. But buying momentum for its own sake is the height of glamor boy laziness and stupidity. There’s too much of it in our business, and it contributes precious little to the economies and societies we operate in.

[The 'glamor boy' link will be nostalgic for anyone who was watching MTV in the late 1980s. While it's hard to take Corey Glover's claims of ferocity seriously while he's wearing a spandex suit and a marching band jacket, it's still a great song.]

URLs:

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB125573856421291217.html?mod=rss_barrons_this_week_magazine

http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/BA-EasyMoney091019.pdf

http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2003/el2003-32.html

http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,842353,00.html

http://economics.uwo.ca/econref/WorkingPapers/researchreports/wp2009/wp2009_2.pdf

http://frank.mtsu.edu/~berc/tnbiz/stimulus/laffer.pdf

http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091019/FREE/910199975/1094/INDaily01

http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091019/FREE/910199982/1094/INDaily01

http://www.wyomingtalesandtrails.com/buffalojump.jpg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XRpuhc9dgU

http://www.wyomingtalesandtrails.com/bison.html

Crowded Trades – A Video Analogue

Claustrophobic tendencies inform a key tenet of our investment philosophy — avoidance of overly crowded trades. We found a perfect video analogue of what a crowded trade looks like:

Thankfully, it’s not quite perfect. If it were, it would also show the train running off the rails.

Interview: “The Skinny on Penny Stocks”

I was quoted in an article about penny stock investing that our friend Jon Heller wrote for Bankrate.com back in August (I’m putting the link up now because we’ve resolved an editorial tussle with Bankrate’s staff over one of my quotes). You may remember that Jon interviewed us back in May regarding our investment philosophy and our active investment strategy, Symmetry Capital’s Opportunistic Portfolio.

Jon asked us to participate because we often purchase low priced shares of companies in the Opportunistic Portfolio. We do this because there are multiple structural and institutional inefficiencies that sometimes create attractive risk-reward situations among low priced securities. However, as all of the experts in Jon’s article point out, there’s a lot of risk and hard work involved in finding the handful of gems among the slag pile of penny stocks, as well as a number of con artists willing to prey upon people’s desire to get rich quick.

It’s a well written article with some good insights – highly recommended.

URLs:

http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/the-skinny-on-penny-stocks-1.aspx

http://stocksbelowncav.blogspot.com/2009/05/cheap-stocks-interview-art-patten_26.html

D.C. Insider Trading

There’s a governance revolution afoot in the world. Beltway and other capital denizens should be careful to take notice.

We posted that claim in January 2007, and 2009 has provided some interesting evidence in support. Furor over lawmakers’ fringe benefits in the U.S. and the U.K. has been a recurring theme, and now we’ve learned of a story that flew below our radar until a segment on CNBC’s “Street Signs” today. Apparently, a bill has been proposed that would subject legislative activities to insider trading rules. The following description is from the website of co-author Rep. Brian Baird, D-WA (emphasis added):

Insider trading should be illegal on Capitol Hill. While that might seem like common sense to some, there is currently no legislation that prohibits Members of Congress or their staffs from enriching their portfolios with the nonpublic information they are able to glean from their day to day jobs. [On July 13, 2009] Congresswoman Louise M. Slaughter (D-NY-28) and Congressman Brian Baird (D-WA-03) took an important step to closing this loophole by testifying before the House Financial Services Committee about their legislation: the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act. When passed, the bill will make Members of Congress and their staffs subject to the same regulations that the general public is subject to.

“Members of Congress and their staffs should not be above the law when it comes to profiting from sensitive information. The American people expect their public servants to represent their interests, not fatten theair stock portfolios,” said Congressman Baird. “The STOCK Act is an important step to restore integrity and public trust in two institutions that badly need it: the financial industry and Congress.”

“This bill is about transparency and fairness,” Slaughter said. “As it stands today, neither Members of Congress nor their staff can be held legally accountable for making personal investment decisions based on non-public information. This bill changes that by opening those individuals up to be included under insider trading rules.”

This is fascinating stuff, and near and dear to our hearts — it captures the importance of legislative activities and the significance of agency risk in the political domain. As we’ve argued elsewhere, actions and expected actions in the public sphere — legislative changes regarding taxes, regulations, etc — can have powerful effects on asset values, and this idea is a key part of our investment process. There is also a novel but growing body of research regarding the the performance impact of privileged legislative information, and it was reported during the CNBC segment that sizable fees are paid to lobbyists and public sector employees by private investors (alleged to be primarily hedge funds) in order to obtain access to it. However, one thing that we really like about the Slaughter-Baird bill is that it focuses directly on the conduct of members of Congress, and does not try to lay most of the blame on private parties extending fistfuls of dollars.

Our philosophical position is that an investor can benefit by (1) understanding how significant a role government plays in investment returns and (2) making well grounded assessments regarding the course and consequences of public actions. But despite what we wrote in 2007, we did not hold out much hope that the outsized investment returns accruing to political insiders and/or their private sector contacts would become the focus of regulatory or legislative scrutiny this soon. We tended to agree with the pessimistic view expressed by James Surowiecki in 2005:

[The American people] don’t seem all that interested in doing much about it…Perhaps we want to keep the insider’s advantage intact because we all want to be inside. The choice is between a system in which people get rewarded for the work they do and a system in which people get rewarded for who they know or for what they’re lucky enough to stumble into. And in Washington today that’s no choice at all.

Thus, Reps. Slaughter and Baird’s bill is a welcome and courageous initiative, even if execution would involve some degree of wind mill tilting (more detail regarding the bill is available on Rep. Baird’s website). Of course, at this point it’s just a bill, and it was also reported on CNBC that there is little likelihood of it coming up for a vote any time soon. However, where Surowiecki’s quote would seem to direct most of the blame towards the American electorate, we wonder if legislators simply enjoy too great of an asymmetry in power and information at present — in which case, while we stand by our opening quote, we don’t think that substantive reforms are likely to arrive any time soon — unfortunately.

In the meantime, if this topic is of interest to you, here are some interesting reads:

James Surowiecki, “Capitol Gains”, New Yorker 10/31/2005

Ferguson and Witte, “Congress and the Stock Market”, 3/13/2006

Ziobrowski et al, “Abnormal Common Stock Investments of Members of the United States Senate”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 2004 (abstract only)

URLs:

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2007/01/a-seamy-trifecta/

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2009/06/tr2-parliament-and-congress/

http://www.cnbc.com/id/15838408/site/14081545/

http://www.baird.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=960&Itemid=99

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/profile/#process

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=4204676

http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/10/31/051031ta_talk_surowiecki