Paul Ryan’s floor speech

As most of the country knows, the House of Representatives passed its latest version of healthcare reform yesterday, and emotions are running high on all sides as a result. Rep. Paul Ryan, a Republican from Wisconsin whom we sincerely admire, seemed to best embody his party’s core philosophical objections to the bill. Unfortunately, too many of the GOP’s arguments are stubbornly anachronistic and overly narrow. They don’t fully reflect the realities of healthcare, and they conveniently overlook the fact that we have had ‘socialized’ medicine in this country for quite some time – since Medicare and Medicaid became laws, and since the tax code and other regulations began to favor group insurance plans.

Our intent isn’t to cheer or take shots at either side. Instead, it’s to raise the level of discourse, something that neither party nor the press has done very well. With an issue as complicated and important as this one, political maturity is a must, and truth telling from leadership is absolutely vital.  Unfortunately, Ryan’s speech was riddled with shallow thinking and empty slogans. Perhaps that suited its purpose, but it does little to move the debate or the electorate in constructive directions.

At 1:45 of the video:  “Our founders got it right, when they wrote in the Declaration of Independence that our rights come from nature and nature’s God, not from government.”

For tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of years, and in almost every part of the world, invoking divinity is how the powerful have justified their position (they still do in some parts of the world). So Jefferson may simply have been speaking the English monarchy’s language when he wrote that in the DOI.

More seriously, in today’s world, rational people ought to be able to agree that political rights are absolutely defined and managed by governments. The classical liberal principle of doing no harm to others is a great starting point, but the philosophical or religious beliefs that inform one’s political philosophy are not in and of themselves “rights”.

In fact, in a society of diverse religious and philosophical views, it’s absolutely vital that a government does just that.

1:57 “Should we now subscribe to an ideology where government creates rights, is solely responsible for delivering these artificial rights, and then systematically rations these rights?”

Government does indeed create rights. It defined and allocated them in the Constitution without any mention of God as a source. And it has amended and reallocated them many times since. Calling them “artificial”, as in man made, is no more meaningful than the typical PETA slogan, or the idea that human creations, good and bad, are somehow ‘unnatural’.

And political institutions absolutely ration individual rights. They always have, all the way back to our hunting and gathering days, so it’s an idea that we really ought to be used to by now. The challenge is to hold governments accountable for doing it in a way that approaches some social optimum. That’s what the Constitution has done rather well over two centuries, and it’s something that modern political institutions have tended to become more adept at over time.

2:09 “Do we believe that the goal of government is to promote equal opportunity for all Americans to make the most of their lives? Or do we now believe that government’s role is to equalize the results of people’s lives?”

Long ago, the federal government enacted some stupid ideas on how to finance health care coverage. For generations, those ideas have benefitted employees of large corporations, unions, and public sector employees. They have been subsidized, either through higher premiums, greater personal risk, or less health care, by the self-employed and entrepreneurs (which may be why politicians always try to kiss their rear ends), as well as those who do not qualify for private insurance coverage, Medicare, or Medicaid. From the get go, these ideas have promoted INEQUALITY.

Healthcare reform is aimed, in part, at finally addressing this situation, a situation that has stood in stark contrast to the principle of equal opportunity. Over the years, the GOP has developed some good ideas on this issue, but in session after session, they utterly failed to do anything about it. They punted repeatedly until the situation got bad enough that the Dems were finally able to run the ball down their throat. Tua culpa, GOP.

Furthermore, this legislation can’t be said to seek equal outcomes, and Ryan surely most know that. It does seek to extend the social safety net, i.e., to redefine the acceptable minimum outcome in personal health care coverage. It also seeks to impose responsibility, in that everyone must chip in in some way. Personally, I don’t care for that kind of thing, and I know I’m not alone in that. Compulsory anything tends to rub Americans the wrong way.

Unfortunately, as long as there is Medicaid, and as long as health care costs of the uninsured are borne socially (via welfare or higher costs for others), it doesn’t make any sense to avoid a minimum level of buy in. It’s similar to having to carry liability coverage on your automobile, except that we are all physical bodies, and thus all have to participate.

If that really rubs you the wrong way, you have a few options:

• Start working on the technology that will provide the bodily equivalent of mass transit and other alternative modes of transport.
• Work to repeal Medicaid (why not Medicare while you’re at it?).
• Move.

2:24 “The philosophy advanced on this floor by this majority today is so paternalistic, and so arrogant. It’s condescending. And it tramples upon the principles that have made America so exceptional.”

Both parties have been guilty of arrogant, condescending paternalism throughout their history. I’m not sure what makes this bill so special. And if we look at the trajectory of American greatness, it’s hard to say that it’s based solely on founding principles (though they’ve certainly made it possible, along with plenty of luck).

Did the U.S. become more exceptional or less after the Progressive movement, the New Deal, and the Great Society? My point is not to sing the usual lefty praises for those episodes, but to point out that they do not seem to have undermined American exceptionalism at all.

3:18 “As we march towards this tipping point of dependency, we are also accelerating toward a debt crisis, a debt crisis that is the result of politicians of the past making promises we simply cannot afford to keep. Deja vu all over again…It’s unconscionable what we are leaving the next generation.”

First I’ll note my love for Yogi Berra quotes. Then I’ll reiterate that there is no U.S. debt crisis.

We do have entitlement and dependency issues to face as a society. But the federal budget is unlike any other budget in our country. It’s not like personal, household, business, or state and local government budgets. In the world, the only budgets that operate in a truly similar fashion are Japan’s and the United Kingdom’s (and in a far more constrained fashion, the European Monetary Union’s). Japan is about ten years ahead of us on the demographic curve, and its net public debt has reached levels that all the deficit hawks in the U.S. now shudder about. What happened? Nothing – no debt crisis, no threat of default, no crowding out. Nothing but a handful of downgrades from the credit rating agencies, and trading floors littered with the bodies of almost two decades worth of misguided hedge fund managers.

And the worst debt to GDP projections, even if we overlook the uncertainty involved in forecasting a decade or more, don’t reach any kind of level that justifies the prevailing deficit anxieties — not for a large modern economy with monopoly power over issuance of the currency used to pay interest on and retire its debts. Until people no longer want to accept dollars (and it’s easy enough for anyone to test out that hypothesis), the government can create more of them. In other words, unlike the rest of us, the only budget constraint faced by the federal government is the socially acceptable level of inflation.

Finally, without proper context, the ‘debt on the backs of our grandchildren’ meme is so much claptrap. If more debt now means better economic outcomes overall, then we are imposing severe opportunity costs on future generations if we do not run larger deficits.

That said, it may be true that health care reform does not represent a social investment with positive ROI. It may also be true that simply rectifying distortions and making the system fairer could have been accomplished with far less than what this bill contains. The electorate has a little over seven months to reflect on it before rendering its judgement in November, and as we’ve noted here and here, this issue deserves a lot more philosophical honesty than it’s been getting. It’s difficult, complicated stuff, with no right or wrong answers – only some as-yet-unknown social optimum, which our sometimes messy political processes are helping us grope our way towards.

URLs:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwk1aHU-pms

http://www.newdeal20.org/2010/02/10/the-federal-budget-is-not-like-a-household-budget-heres-why-8230/

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2009/07/should-health-care-be-a-right/

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2009/07/ryan-what-does-it-look-like-in-september/

Bernanke: “It wasn’t us.” BIS: “Yes it was.”

A couple more interesting pieces in the to-and-fro on whether the Fed and other central banks played a role in fostering asset bubbles in the early 2000s:

First, the Economist takes apart former and current Fed chairment Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke’s recent defenses of monetary policy:

…both [Greenspan and Bernanke] say there is no evidence that low short-term rates drove house prices upward. Mr Greenspan argues that the statistical relationship between house prices and long-term rates is much stronger than with the Fed’s policy rates, and that during the early 2000s the traditionally high correlation between policy rates and long-term rates fell apart. Mr Bernanke points to structural models which show that only a modest part of the house-price boom can be pinned on monetary policy.

…There is something odd about central bankers denying any responsibility at all for long-term rates, which are, in principle, based partly on an assessment of a stream of short-term rates. Nor is it clear that low short-term rates were as irrelevant as Messrs Bernanke and Greenspan suggest. Jeremy Stein of Harvard University, a discussant of Mr Greenspan’s Brookings paper, points out that low policy rates may have mattered a great deal for income-constrained borrowers. He points out that adjustable-rate mortgages were used much more in expensive cities, a trend that became more pronounced as the fund rates fell.

By looking only at the effect of monetary policy on house prices, Messrs Bernanke and Greenspan also take too narrow a view of the potential effect of low policy rates. Several economists have argued convincingly, for instance, that low policy rates fuelled broader leverage growth in securitised markets.

Second, the Bank of International Settlements has published a paper arguing emphatically that monetary policy in the form of low interest rates can and does contribute to speculative risk taking by banks:

Using a unique database that includes quarterly balance sheet information for listed banks operating in the European Union and the United States in the last decade, we find evidence that unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in banks’ risk. This result holds for a wide range of measures of risk, as well as macroeconomic and institutional controls…

It is a very bad thing when the leader and former leader of an institution as critical as the Fed decide to cover their asses instead of engaging in critical assessment and truth telling. Personally, I don’t find it surprising with Mr. Greenspan, as I’ve never held a high opinion of the man (in my limited view, his primary professional achievement seems to have been the elevation of personality cult management to new levels). We’re more disappointed in Mr. Bernanke – still think he’s the right man for the job though. 

URLs:

http://www.economist.com/business-finance/economics-focus/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15719180

http://www.bis.org/publ/work298.pdf?noframes=1

Stiglitz: The Dangers of Deficit Reduction

A timely column from Nobel economist Joe Stiglitz (emphasis added):

A wave of fiscal austerity is rushing over Europe and America…But despite protests by the yesterday’s proponents of deregulation, who would like the government to remain passive, most economists believe that government spending has made a difference, helping to avert another Great Depression.

…even deficit hawks acknowledge that we should be focusing not on today’s deficit, but on the long-term national debt. Spending, especially on investments in education, technology, and infrastructure, can actually lead to lower long-term deficits. Banks’ short-sightedness helped create the crisis; we cannot let government short-sightedness – prodded by the financial sector – prolong it.

Faster growth and returns on public investment yield higher tax revenues, and a 5 to 6% return is more than enough to offset temporary increases in the national debt. A social cost-benefit analysis (taking into account impacts other than on the budget) makes such expenditures, even when debt-financed, even more attractive.

In those last two paragraphs, Stiglitz is pointing out that if the returns on public spending are greater than the cost of financing them, then the future debt level will actually be lower. The government’s current cost of financing is simply the yield on Treasury debt. As of Friday, the ten year Treasury note yields 3.7%, while thirty year Treasury bonds yield about 4.6%. If publicly financed investments can be expected to return more than those figures, then undertaking them — and adding to current deficits and debt levels — is a no-brainer.

And as long as the yields on the securities of private sector issuers aren’t abnormally higher than those on Treasuries, the argument that the federal government is going to ‘crowd out’ the private sector is without merit.

Of course, it’s debatable (1) whether public expenditures are likely to produce returns of that magnitude and (2) whether future Congresses, Administrations, and Treasury Departments will manage the federal balance sheet appropriately. Unfortunately, no one’s openly debating these points. Instead, we’re treated to pithy but nonstop dogma from both sides, and a peculiar obfuscation by those in the middle, which in all cases overlook the basic financial calculus that Stiglitz reminds us of in his column.

Most importantly for debt and deficit hawks and those who fear higher taxes (those whom econo-nerds would refer to as ‘Ricardian equivalence’ subscribers), when the financial calculus is positive, then the debt service associated with marginal federal spending can be financed organically, via higher growth, rather than through higher taxes.

In short, people on all sides of the deficit issue should be able to agree, at least on financial and economic grounds, that investments yielding more than their cost of financing, when they do not crowd out private sector borrowing or resource demand, should absolutely be carried out.

—

Unfortunately, Stiglitz overlooks his own argument when he writes the following, which make us wonder if he doubts his 5 to 6% return figures, or if he’s just offering a gratuitous slap at the financial sector (emphasis added):

As the global economy returns to growth, governments should, of course, have plans on the drawing board to raise taxes and cut expenditures…

Continuing with his love of taxes:

The financial sector has imposed huge externalities on the rest of society. America’s financial industry polluted the world with toxic mortgages, and, in line with the well established “polluter pays” principle, taxes should be imposed on it. Besides, well-designed taxes on the financial sector might help alleviate problems caused by excessive leverage and banks that are too big to fail. Taxes on speculative activity might encourage banks to focus greater attention on performing their key societal role of providing credit.

As we’ve pointed out elsewhere, the domestic financial sector is going to shrink even without  punitive measures, as demographic composition shifts away from the saving and investing age groups. Well-designed regulation might be a better approach than taxes to constraining financial sector activities to socially beneficial ones (we admit that a ‘Tobin tax’ can be the most efficient approach to regulation under certain conditions, but aren’t convinced that it’s optimal for the financial sector).

And it would be profoundly unjust for the federal government, which so strongly encouraged and underwrote the expansion of mortgage financing (Stiglitz’ “pollution”), to retroactively punish the financial sector, its employees, and its current and future clients for simply following the government’s orders.

Stiglitz also takes a step back from his underlying thesis with this sentence:

Over the longer term, most economists agree that governments, especially in advanced industrial countries with aging populations, should be concerned about the sustainability of their policies.

From a technical standpoint, this isn’t as iron clad as so many of us reflexively believe. First, we have no idea whether an aging population is bound to be a drag on an economy, whether it depends on particular conditions, or anything else. There simply isn’t much historical data available to test such a proposition. Second, if we assume that it is a significant drag, then policies that are seen as unsustainable under “normal” conditions might very well be the most sustainable under those novel conditions. This could include expanded deficit spending and public debt, and/or expansion of money supply.

[To be fair, Stiglitz is almost certainly referring to entitlement spending obligations in that passage, which might be a bird of a different feather. We're just using it as an opportunity to critique some of the conventional wisdom around demographics.]

—

Despite Sitglitz’ inability to break out of his New Keynesian box, or part ways with his passion for higher taxes, we agree wholeheartedly with his essential argument:

…even with large deficits, economic growth in the US and Europe is anemic, and forecasts of private-sector growth suggest that in the absence of continued government support, there is risk of continued stagnation – of growth too weak to return unemployment to normal levels anytime soon.

The risks are asymmetric: if these forecasts are wrong, and there is a more robust recovery, then, of course, expenditures can be cut back and/or taxes increased. But if these forecasts are right, then a premature “exit” from deficit spending risks pushing the economy back into recession. This is one of the lessons we should have learned from America’s experience in the Great Depression; it is also one of the lessons to emerge from Japan’s experience in the late 1990’s.

…we must be wary of deficit fetishism…high-return public investments that more than pay for themselves can actually improve the well-being of future generations, and it would be doubly foolish to burden them with debts from unproductive spending and then cut back on productive investments.

These are questions for a later day – at least in many countries, prospects of a robust recovery are, at best, a year or two away. For now, the economics is clear: reducing government spending is a risk not worth taking. 

URLs:

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz123/English

http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yield.shtml

Greece and Goldman

There’s been a good deal of news swirl about Goldman Sachs’ role in entering into swaps contracts with Greece in order to assist it in “hiding” some of its public debt as it prepared to enter the EMU.

Here’s a good primer from 2003 on these types of swaps, and an interesting thought piece on it from Ed Harrison.

URLs:

http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/1498135/revealed-goldman-sachs-mega-deal-greece

http://seekingalpha.com/article/190390-inside-the-mind-of-an-investment-banker-greece-goldman-and-derivatives

The hawks are circ(u)l(at)ing

Two interesting and somewhat discouraging trial balloons have been floated by the Senate recently:

Schumer-Hatch payroll tax break

First, in a NYT op-ed, Sens. Schumer and Hatch propose a payroll tax credit for employers who hire someone who’s been out of work for 60 days or more. This is intended to be a much simpler approach than the disastrous jobs tax credit of the 1970s:

…any private-sector employer that hires a worker who had been unemployed for at least 60 days will not have to pay its 6.2 percent Social Security payroll tax on that employee for the duration of 2010. The Social Security trust fund will then be made whole with spending cuts elsewhere in the budget between now and 2015. That’s it. Simple to understand, and easy to explain.

Simplicity is a reasonable objective, but as described, the proposal is NOT going to stimulate a return to full employment, because it’s fiscally hawkish, i.e., it aims for budget neutrality. Thus, the net economic effect is likely to be somewhere around nil, give or take.

It also gives no payroll tax break to the newly hired employees! That is NOT likely to play well to a frustrated electorate. Warren Mosler’s version of a payroll tax holiday would be fairer and much bolder. As he framed it at a recent Tea Party get together:

I believe that the surest engine for full economic recovery is a full payroll tax holiday. Payroll taxes take away over 15% of everyone’s paycheck, from the very first dollar earned. This is big money- about $1 trillion per year. Half comes from the employee and half from the employer. A payroll tax holiday does not give anyone anything. What it does is stop taking away $1 trillion a year from working people struggling to make their payments and stay in their homes, and businesses struggling to survive. A full payroll tax holiday means a husband and wife earning $50,000 a year each will see their combined take home pay go up by over $650 a month, so they can make their mortgage payments and their car payments and maybe even do a little shopping.

In their op-ed, the Senators also claimed:

Our two-pronged approach would be a far more efficient use of taxpayer dollars than other proposals under discussion, all of which could cost many times more with very little guaranteed improvement in unemployment. [emphasis added]

Taking care to use taxpayer dollars efficiently is a wonderful thing when resources are fully employed and there are sufficient dollars in circulation. But in the prevailing environment, it’s far too hawkish. As some have noted, the key factor that will incentivize hiring is for businesses to see signs of improving demand; tax breaks like this one are unlikely to have more than a marginal effect. And as long as Congress is stingy about deficits and about where taxpayer dollars come from, it could merely reallocate existing resources, rather than raise overall employment.

The entire idea brings to mind the old Hefty Bag jingo: WIMPY WIMPY WIMPY!!!

Senate jobs bill

Second, Senate Democrats have been circulating a comprehensive jobs bill that includes the Schumer-Hatch proposal. Positive features include extension of unemployment benefits and subsidies. More questionable are the extensions of various expired tax provisions through the end of 2010. Like financing federal expenditures with existing “taxpayer dollars”, sunset provisions will tend to offset any stimulative effects of ’stimulus’.

From the proposed measures in the bill, it looks like members of Congress, especially Senators, believe that their reelection prospects hinge on budget and debt hawkishness. That might well be true, given that our educational system has done a lousy job teaching economics for generations. If that’s their angle, then they’re as bad as their policy ideas: WIMPY WIMPY WIMPY!!!

It’s estimated that the bill would create 80,000 to 180,000 new jobs in the coming year. We would need 180,000 or so per month to meaningfully reduce unemployment. Taking secondary effects into account, the typical employment multiplier falls in a range of roughly 2 to 4. That means that the overall impact on employment would range from 160,000 to 1.44 million new jobs in 2010. This would make less than an 18% dent in the number of jobs lost in this recession! [We've assumed that multiplier effects are not accounted for in that number; if they are, the package is even more pathetic.]

Admittedly, we’re leaving out private sector employment and the related multipliers, and 1.44 million new jobs would still be a good thing. But the glaring problem is that policymakers seem to believe that the real economy is in the kind of shape it’s been in since the mid-1980s, and that it will do just fine with the federal government contributing a net 20% or so to economic activity. We strongly disagree, and would point out that policymakers in Japan made the same error over their two lost decades. Policymakers need to dramatically raise expectations in the private economy, whether it’s through spending, tax cuts, or a combination of both. Wimpy proposals are not going to get it done.  

If the Senate bill is as good as we get, then our strong dollar call remains in place, and incumbents could face some rough sledding in November. The Obama administration is reportedly trying to work some better features into the bill, but most of them have an undeniable fiscal wimpiness to them, and thus won’t do much to alleviate the stubborn shortage of dollars, income, and employment in the real economy.

As J. Wellington Wimpy might say, “You will gladly pay me today for a job created tomorrow.”

Update 2/14/2010 – Perhaps this description of neo-Keynesian economics explains the cruelty of Hatch-Schumer:  “Tax cuts can deepen a recession if the short-term nominal interest rate is zero, according to a standard New Keynesian business cycle model. An example of a contractionary tax cut is a reduction in taxes on wages. This tax cut deepens a recession because it increases deflationary pressures.”  Good grief. The honorable gentlemen should note that this is just economic theory, which is far from settled (and that economists are probably not a good source of reelection advice). 

URLs:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/opinion/26hatch.html?scp=2&sq=orrin%20hatch&st=cse

http://moslereconomics.com/2010/02/04/dallas-address/

http://www.webcpa.com/news/Senate-Democrats-Jobs-Bill-Includes-Tax-Breaks-53257-1.html

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100210/ap_on_bi_ge/us_what_jobs_11

http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr402.pdf

Krugman vs CNBC

A couple of CNBC commentators ripped Paul Krugman for today’s op-ed on budget deficits, with Rick Santelli saying something about lining a bird cage. We aren’t defending Krugman against charges of self-contradiction or factual inaccuracies, but we are definitely siding with him on the economic substance of his argument (the lonely wingnut’s sojourn continues).

Prevailing rhetoric holds that the U.S. government is over extended, and that there’s precious little room for additional economic stimulus. That would be true if US dollars could only be obtained by taking them from people who have them, or by digging new ones out of the ground. In that case, servicing our debts — both private and public — would be quite burdensome. But the reality is that in a modern monetary system, monetary units are simply ledger entries. Whether carried in hand as a Treasury obligation, or held digitally in a bank account, all dollars are created out of thin air by the Federal Reserve in response to demands of the banking system.

The federal government does not have direct control of the Federal Reserve, so its control of money creation is only indirect (if Congress wished, it could wrest control of USD creation from the quasi-private Fed, a measure that a small number of radical but diverse members might like to see). But existing arrangements do not change the basic fact that the U.S. has the capacity to print the money (the non-interest bearing debt) used to service its public debt. That means that the only meaningful constraint on the level of our pubic debt is people’s willingness to accept the USD. And despite the sophomoric rhetoric on that point, people are still overwhelmingly willing to accept USDs.

The claim that Congress is “spending money that we don’t have” is even more egregious. To reiterate: if USDs could only be dug out of the ground, or pulled out of taxpayers’ pockets, then the argument might make some sense. But as long as we have the ability to create USDs out of thin air, then Congress has the ability to spend new USDs instead of existing ones.

The conservative argument against this type of Keynesian activism rests on a couple of key pillars, and under certain conditions, they’re valid: (1) as long as government constraints on the private sector are moderate, an economy will grow at or near full capacity; (2) public demand for capital will always tend to ‘crowd out’ private sector borrowing; and (3) public sector allocation of capital is inevitably distorted, which imposes long run economic costs. 

As long as those assumptions are valid, then Congressional thrift, beyond a basic level of social insurance and national defense spending, is a desirable objective. However:

(1) History doesn’t lend strong support to the idea that an unbridled private sector will always and everywhere produce positive growth; and if monetary policy is constrained by a zero bound (i.e., interest rates can’t go below zero), then whenever growth is below potential, fiscal stimulus is appropriate (and can be enacted in myriad ways that appeal to lefties or righties). This is especially true for long economic cycles, such as the Great Depression, Japan from 1989 until 2008 or so, and several developed western economies since roughly 1999. Judging by the available empirical research, demographic composition could be the main driver of these cycles (and if the effect is strong enough, it might deemphasize the importance of rationality vs behavioralism in theory and policy making).

(2) When private sector demand for capital is contracting, as can happen in a long down cycle, then public sector demand for capital (i.e., deficits and debt issuance) is beneficial, and should foster rather than crowd out private sector credit demand. However, under certain conditions, this will only work if money creation is supportive of public sector credit demand, i.e, if new money is created to finance the public sector debt (the conservative point of view tends to see this as banana republic monetary policy, but that isn’t always the case). Today, banks are taking advantage of a steep yield curve to borrow funds from the Federal Reserve (which creates new USDs) to purchase higher yielding Treasury debt, i.e., a significant amount of our public debt is being ‘monetized’. While that would be a bad thing in an inflationary environment, it’s a good thing when it offsets deflationary forces. Almost everyone who parrots the prevailing rhetoric is overlooking this dynamic.

(3) Public sector capital allocation is certainly prone to distortion in as much as it is not subjected to competition and the judgement of diverse agents. But asymmetries in the private sector can have powerfully negative effects too (financial crisis, anyone?). And while there’s room in our political system for new institutions designed to allocate public resources more optimally, the existing ones, such as voting, negotiation, and oversight, should do a good enough job in the meantime.

Krugman wrote that “there’s no reason to panic about budget prospects for the next few years, or even for the next decade,” and apparently this has some pundits and analysts pulling their hair out. But if prevailing demographic ratios are going to drive another decade of subpar economic outcomes…then he’s absolutely right!  

When the real economy is humming along, we can leave the creation and allocation of new USDs to the private sector, and rein in public deficits without doing too much harm. But when the state of the real economy is uncertain, as it certainly is now (pun intended), the refusal to finance public spending, investment, and intermediation via the creation of new dollars (within the constraints dictated by inflation objectives and expectations) is inherently deflationary and destructive. And that is what undermines the sophomoric notion that we are “leaving a mountain of debt to our grandchildren.” If the public sector is not active enough to offset destructive forces acting in the economy today, then our grandchildren will be worse off. Like most economic variables, public debt levels mean nothing in isolation. And we shouldn’t just look at it relative to current GDP. We must also look at it relative to opportunity cost, or looked at another way, to future GDP. There are actions that the public sector can take today to favorably impact GDP in the future, but they all require financing, including deficit spending. We should only be frightened of deficits when they are scarier than the opportunity costs imposed by government saving. Today, that is simply not the case.

So Krugman is right to be concerned about the policy outlook, which he has a rather pessimistic view of:

Washington now has its priorities all wrong: all the talk is about how to shave a few billion dollars off government spending, while there’s hardly any willingness to tackle mass unemployment. Policy is headed in the wrong direction — and millions of Americans will pay the price.

We’ve expressed similar concerns since 2H09, but it now looks to us as though the Obama administration is “triangulating” on deficits and the federal debt, with no intention to substantially withdraw fiscal stimulus in the government’s 2011 fiscal year (though again, we’re still trying to figure out how the president’s emphasis on PAYGO fits into this). If we’re right, then the readjustments underway in exchange rates, specifically the Euro and USD, are being driven by the Euro and sovereign debt concerns, rather than from the USD side. That means we should settle into a new exchange rate equilibrium in the coming weeks, at which point risky assets should start to recover. It’s going to be a bumpy ride, but we’ll get there.

URLs:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/opinion/05krugman.html

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is an Amazon.com associate, and earns a commission on sales generated through links from our website. At the time of writing, the firm, its principals, and its clients did not own any securities mentioned, or any securities issued by entities mentioned.

Global sell off and the EMU

Markets for risky assets — stocks, commodities — are down significantly around the world today. The selling is reportedly being caused by intensifying worries over government debt levels in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland (the so-called PIIGS), and the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis for one or more of them. The USD is up, continuing its months long rally.

The European Monetary Union is an interesting contrast to the U.S. It shares a common currency, the euro, which is analogous to the USD here. The governing agreements of the EMU require that each member state impose a certain level of fiscal discipline, i.e., government budget constraints. That’s the nominal policy, but imposing discipline on member countries has proven to be elusive. The important difference between the U.S. and the EMU is that our federal government sets both fiscal and (quasi-public) monetary policies at a national level, while in the EMU, monetary policy is set at the highest level, but fiscal policies are pursued by individual countries, and they can vary quite a bit, from German thrift to PIIGS’ profligacy (there also tend to be tighter constraints on state and local budget deficits in the U.S. than in some European countries). The result is that national governments in the EMU do not have the power to create the non-interest bearing debt (the euro) used to service their interest bearing debt. Technically, the U.S. doesn’t either, as the Fed is not a government agency, but it’s fair to say that Congress and the Administration wield far more power over the Federal Reserve than European governments do over the ECB. 

So when highly leveraged sovereigns in Europe run into trouble, like Portugal’s recent failed debt auction, there’s plenty of consternation and conflict among EMU members about the appropriate measures to take. That uncertainty may indeed be causing increased investor pessimism, and raising the probability that one or more of these countries defaults on its debt.

A CNBC commentator also pointed out that credit default swaps, the cause of AIG’s demise, could be playing a role. This market is still largely unregulated, unfortunately. If a CDS were nothing more than a betting contract between gamblers, they wouldn’t be a big deal. But the CDS market is huge. It has gone well beyond its primary purpose of hedging credit risk, instead allowing active and highly levered speculation on credit troubles, and the ‘notional’ value of contracts far exceeds the actual amount of debt outstanding. Many of the counter parties involved in the CDS market are intimately tied to the global payments system, so an implosion affects all of us. It’s for that reason that updated financial regulation is so critical, whether it’s to tax principal trading assets, limit the level of credit default insurance to the actual level of an issuer’s debt, limit or monitor systemic leverage, etc.

That segues into an important consideration regarding the potential economic impact of a sovereign debt crisis. Some analysts and commentators point out that the economies of the countries at risk are a small percentage of global or even European GDP. However, Lehman Brothers was also small relative to world or U.S. GDP. What’s important from a systemic standpoint is the number of financial commitments associated with the sovereign paper that is at risk of defaulting, i.e., the systemic fragility that could be exposed by such an outcome. The global financial system has deleveraged significantly since 2007, but from astronomical levels; a large loss on sovereign paper could still destroy a lot of capital in fairly short order. There’s also contagion risk — if more than one of these sovereigns were to default, the relative size of the problem would be larger.

Interestingly, we’re bullish on all but one of these countries in the longer term, so we’re looking for opportunity amid the crisis.  

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is an Amazon.com associate, and earns a commission on sales generated through links from our website. At the time of writing, the firm, its principals, and its clients did not own any securities mentioned, or any securities issued by entities mentioned.

Volatility? Shocking!

The news flow this week has put equity markets into one of their periodic panics. It’s been almost a year since the last one, so in the long term, this might be healthy. Healthy or not, it’s peculiar how closely these shakeouts have coincided with the political calendar, and judging by available academic research, the market should be better prepared for air pockets like the current one. For example, according to a 1997 study by Lamb et al:

Almost the entire advance in the [stock] market since 1897 corresponds to the periods when Congress is in recess. This is an impressive result, given that Congress is in recess about half as long as in session. Furthermore, average daily returns when Congress is not meeting are almost thirteen times greater than when Congress is in session. Throughout the year, cumulative returns during recess are eight times that experienced while Congress is in session. [emphasis added]

Or this 2006 study by Michael Ferguson and H. Douglas Witte:

We find a strong link between Congressional activity and stock market returns that persists even after controlling for known daily return anomalies. Stock returns are lower and volatility is higher when Congress is in session. This “Congressional Effect” can be quite large—more than 90% of the capital gains over the life of the DJIA have come on days when Congress is out of session. The Effect varies systematically with the public’s opinion of Congress: returns are lower and volatility higher when a relatively unpopular Congress is active. Public opinion appears to play a fundamental role in market prices. This is consistent with a mood-based explanation that sees Congress as ‘depressing’ the average investor. Alternatively, our results can also be reconciled with rational explanations that view Congressional activity as a proxy for regulatory uncertainty or rent-seeking behavior. [emphasis added]

Federal policies have a powerful effect on asset prices, and risk aversion has been very low until this week. With Congress back in town, the President on the war path, and widespread gnashing of teeth and rending of garments over budget deficits and the federal debt, volatility had nowhere to go but up. Our advice? Don’t worry about it (too much). It would be great if our elected leaders inspired more confidence and certainty, but political noise happens — the current bout might even need to happen in order to get satisfactory regulatory reforms enacted. However, we have one of the best (if not the best) political systems for correcting political errors. 

The big question ahead of us is how closely we’ll skirt a 1937 outcome, which shouldn’t be a material risk until 2011-12. The Treasury yield curve will probably provide the best clues. If longer term yields come down considerably in 2010, watch out. 

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. 

URLs:

http://www.unf.edu/~rlamb/Docs/FinServRev.pdf

http://www.fma.org/Orlando/Papers/Congress_and_the_Stock_Market.pdf

Bookstaber: ‘Controlled Burn’

Rick Bookstaber put forth an interesting argument about easing debt burdens on the public and private sectors through “controlled burn” inflation. If creditors aren’t willing to take large enough haircuts, that’s pretty much what you have to do to get aggregate credit burdens to a more manageable or desirable level.

There are a lot of misperceptions around this issue. FDR allegedly devalued the dollar c. 1934 by repegging it to gold at $35, instead of the $20 that prevailed before WWI. But if you look at the historical data, the USD was powerfully deflationary in the years leading up that action. And at best, the repegging only stemmed the rate of deflation. It did not create any inflation at all. In fact, the more closely we look at the data, the more closely aligned we become with folks who argue that the New Deal didn’t go far enough.  Paul Krugman’s warning in 2008 is looking fairly prescient:

…Barack Obama should learn from F.D.R.’s failures as well as from his achievements: the truth is that the New Deal wasn’t as successful in the short run as it was in the long run. And the reason for F.D.R.’s limited short-run success, which almost undid his whole program, was the fact that his economic policies were too cautious.

[I would add that other FDR actions were too bullheaded and hasty, errors that Obama also risks repeating.]

During the recent crisis and recession, plenty of pundits argued that USD devaluation would be the order of the day. We saw some risk of that, but not as much as those who pointed repeatedly to the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented balance sheet expansion of 2008-2009, or the federal government’s enlarged deficits. That’s because those factors are meaningless if the private sector is not taken into account (i.e., the effects of monetary policy and public and private sector borrowing are not independent). If there’s intensive deleveraging and a rising desire for saving in the private sector, then expansive actions by the central bank and federal government are merely going to absorb some slack. Ony if they absorb more slack than exists will there be any risk of inflation.

Unfortunately, of late, the messages coming out of almost all political quarters is that the slack in the real economy is going to increase — and that means higher deflationary risk, and conversely to Bookstaber’s argument, rising real credit burdens. That, in turn, will lead to credit after shocks and rising unemployment. Granted, to the extent that people’s nominal income stays the same, real incomes rise in a deflationary environment, so this would be good news for pensioners, savers, and highly valued employees. But we shouldn’t overlook the real opportunity costs that deflation implies.

We see a threat of increasing slack because there’s a rising chorus of fiscal hawkishness all around us. Today, Rep. Chris Van Hollen, chairman of the Democratic caucus, told a CNBC interviewer that the government ”need[s] to get every penny back” from TARP. Yesterday, Republican Rep. Jeb Hensarling said that the election of Scott Brown was a sign that voters cared about debt and deficits (to be fair, he did mention lowering capital gains and payroll taxes, but debt and deficits seemed to be on the top of his mind). Today, a CNBC commentator referred to “your [taxpayers'] money” leading into a report on pending transportation spending. Policymakers are treading the line between semi-sensibility and madness.

First, Congress and the Administration should look forward. That requires changing the regulatory framework in a way that will prevent excessive systemic fragility in the future, and that’s the direction that Obama laid out in his remarks yesterday, with Paul Volcker, who imposed a massive deflationary contraction as Fed chairman in the early 1980s,  smiling in the background. But all else equal, this will lower overall credit capacity, and demanding full repayment of TARP will will make it worse. In order to avoid a double dip, the federal government has to act as the borrower of last resort, i.e., run larger deficits. To us, that’s the real problem with the path being laid out by Obama and Democratic leaders — taking with one hand, and not giving with the other, means economic contraction, all else equal.

Second, debt and deficit hawkishness could not be more untimely. We should pay serious attention to where and how public expenditures are directed, but we need to be honest about the need for significant deficit financed expenditures. Looking at underlying demographic structure, we probably shouldn’t concern ourselves with lowering the federal debt until the end of this coming decade.

Finally, the dollar is ”our money” in the sense that we use it to pay our tax liabilities to a government that has monopoly power to create it. Better yet, it creates it out of thin air (yes, if that power is abused or misused, it can lead to inflation, even hyperinflation, but the risk of such an outcome right now is very, very low). If fiscal policy does indeed swing in a more hawkish direction, then there’s going to be a surfeit of monetary units. And the more we taxpayers or our elected representatives grab for ”our money”, the worse it’s going to get. This ‘chartalist’ view is also somewhat complicated by the fact that our money creation process is controlled by the quasi-public Federal Reserve system. That means that the federal government can only issue interest bearing debt to finance its deficits. It sells those securities to primary dealer banks at auction. And the primary dealers rely on the Federal Reserve system to create the monetary units (the non-interest bearing debt of the U.S. government) that are used to purchase its interest bearing debt.

Keeping those last three sentences in mind, consider that:

• The President intends to tighten the tax and regulatory collars on the banks
• Fed Chairman Bernanke’s confirmation by the Senate is now in serious doubt
• Government spending and investment are especially critical in this recession (see here and here)
• Policymakers are clearly signalling that they’re going to get serious about “fiscal responsibility” 

The clear implication is that USDs are more likely to increase in value. So while Rick Bookstaber is right about the ability of inflation to lower existing debt burdens, it looks to us like we’re headed in the opposite direction, at least for now. The consequences will be discouraging to just about everybody.

URLs:

http://rick.bookstaber.com/2010/01/controlled-burn-inflation.html

http://www.aei.org/article/26390

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/opinion/10krugman.html

http://research.stlouisfed.com/recession/gdpdata.html

http://research.stlouisfed.com/recession/indicators.html

A Strong Dollar Call

President Obama, continuing his recent streak of verbal fiscal hawkishness (our view is admittedly contrarian) signed a memorandum today regarding tax delinquencies among government contractors. To the extent that federal contracts are awared to tax evaders and tax cheats due to poor information sharing or availability, this is a good initiative, and it’s based on analyses from the GAO like this one.

It was the President’s remarks that were most telling, especially his argument that the federal government needs to align itself with the values and norms that tax paying households live by (of course, this completely ignores the fact that only the federal government can create the money required to fulfill tax, debt, and other financial obligations, not just of the public sector, but of the private sector as well). The underlying message of recent remarks by the President is that tightening via “fiscal discipline” is very likely in the months and years ahead; Obama is clearly signalling that he has staked out a very center-right position among Democrats, similar to the Blue Dogs and Democratic Leadership Council, as summed up in this recent piece by Harold Ford, Jr:

The ability of the private sector to produce new jobs — our economic future — depends on how quickly we can get back on the path to fiscal responsibility. This means that any health-care reform plan should be paid for — a promise that President Obama has made, and one that his predecessor should have made.

Ford’s assertions are based on the rather shaky assumption that they hold under all economic conditions. But as we’ve noted recently, there are only some environments where this holds true, while there are other environments where it does not. In the former, fiscal conservatism may be appropriate due to “crowding out” and other concerns. In the latter, the private sector’s capacity to produce jobs actually depends on public sector demand, investment, and intermediation, i.e., deficits. 

Most people, Ford included, accept this idea in the short run, e.g., during a financial crisis or a sharp economic downturn. But what we’re arguing, essentially, is that pessimistic expectations are sometimes rational, and that the factors driving them can theoretically remain in force over fairly long cycles of ten, twenty, or thirty years, even longer.  In the situation at hand, when we look at demographic shifts in the U.S. and residual damage from the financial crisis, we think the decade ahead will be of the latter variety in both the U.S. and mature European economies.  So the message of Ford, his fellow Blue Dogs, the DLC, and President Obama (especially of late) might be a suboptimal direction for policy, however well it might have worked in the 1980s and 1990s. [1/20/2010 UPDATE - well written piece here on how public thinking about policy is heavily informed by experiences since the 1980s, which might be akin to driving by the rear view mirror]

As a result, we now see several forces at work that lead us to expect a strengthening USD, all else equal. First, the prevailing view among Democrats appears to be that voters will favor fiscal hawks in midterm elections, and they will respond accordingly. Second, we expect upside volatility in the real economy in 2010 (due in no small part to public sector demand), which will relax pressures for additional fiscal stimulus. Third, invoking the ideas of the neo-Chartalists, we’d argue that when the federal government places a high value on “fiscal responsibility” or “fiscal conservatism”, it implies that monetary units are going to become more scarce, and thus more valuable. In other words, if the President’s recent signalling is sincere, the USD is likely to appreciate (as will Treasuries, despite their compressed yields), and commodities and other carry trade and risky assets are likely to suffer (today’s market movements seem to support this argument).

While most pundits are attributing today’s market developments to the Republican capture of Kennedy’s senate seat yesterday, and/or to policy tightening in China, which are almost certainly factors, we would argue that far too many are overlooking the impact that President Obama’s current policy tenor is having on the USD. He’s essentially promising that the “tokens” required to settle economic transactions and engage in productive activity are going to become scarcer.

This implies some important changes in who the marginal actors are in the political economy. After the 2008 election, we asserted that the Blue Dogs would be the marginal player in setting the course of economic policy. The President’s upcoming budget will give us a clearer idea of whether their fiscal conservatism, as Obama’s current rhetoric implies, has indeed become dominant. If it has, then we think the Fed becomes the marginal factor in policy direction and economic outcomes. How soon and how sharply they tighten will determine the risk of a 1937 or Japan style recession, and it will also have critical implications for the performance of emerging market equities and other risky assets in the short to intermediate term.

URLs:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-and-agencies-1

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07742t.pdf

http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=255070&kaid=85&subid=65

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chartalism

http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp-pdf/WP10-Wray.pdf