Bernanke: “It wasn’t us.” BIS: “Yes it was.”

A couple more interesting pieces in the to-and-fro on whether the Fed and other central banks played a role in fostering asset bubbles in the early 2000s:

First, the Economist takes apart former and current Fed chairment Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke’s recent defenses of monetary policy:

…both [Greenspan and Bernanke] say there is no evidence that low short-term rates drove house prices upward. Mr Greenspan argues that the statistical relationship between house prices and long-term rates is much stronger than with the Fed’s policy rates, and that during the early 2000s the traditionally high correlation between policy rates and long-term rates fell apart. Mr Bernanke points to structural models which show that only a modest part of the house-price boom can be pinned on monetary policy.

…There is something odd about central bankers denying any responsibility at all for long-term rates, which are, in principle, based partly on an assessment of a stream of short-term rates. Nor is it clear that low short-term rates were as irrelevant as Messrs Bernanke and Greenspan suggest. Jeremy Stein of Harvard University, a discussant of Mr Greenspan’s Brookings paper, points out that low policy rates may have mattered a great deal for income-constrained borrowers. He points out that adjustable-rate mortgages were used much more in expensive cities, a trend that became more pronounced as the fund rates fell.

By looking only at the effect of monetary policy on house prices, Messrs Bernanke and Greenspan also take too narrow a view of the potential effect of low policy rates. Several economists have argued convincingly, for instance, that low policy rates fuelled broader leverage growth in securitised markets.

Second, the Bank of International Settlements has published a paper arguing emphatically that monetary policy in the form of low interest rates can and does contribute to speculative risk taking by banks:

Using a unique database that includes quarterly balance sheet information for listed banks operating in the European Union and the United States in the last decade, we find evidence that unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in banks’ risk. This result holds for a wide range of measures of risk, as well as macroeconomic and institutional controls…

It is a very bad thing when the leader and former leader of an institution as critical as the Fed decide to cover their asses instead of engaging in critical assessment and truth telling. Personally, I don’t find it surprising with Mr. Greenspan, as I’ve never held a high opinion of the man (in my limited view, his primary professional achievement seems to have been the elevation of personality cult management to new levels). We’re more disappointed in Mr. Bernanke – still think he’s the right man for the job though. 

URLs:

http://www.economist.com/business-finance/economics-focus/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15719180

http://www.bis.org/publ/work298.pdf?noframes=1

Masters of the Universe: They’re baaaack…

A new BIS paper has some very telling data points. First, they demonstrate the extent to which leveraged financial speculation drove foreign currency movements in the financial crisis (it’s quite reasonable to assume that this factor was at work in other asset class dislocations too). Second, it provides evidence that highly leveraged masters of the universe were back to their old tricks in fairly short order.

Let’s start with a  quick primer on “carry trades.”  A carry trade occurs when a financial market participant borrows in some currency with a low nominal interest rate (the “funding currency”) and invests the loan proceeds in some asset(s) (a “target asset”) that’s expected to appreciate at a rate that exceeds the interest rate due on the borrowed currency. The target asset can be a higher yielding currency, a credit instrument, equities or a stock market proxy, commodities or a commodity index proxy, and so on.

The Yen carry trade — borrowing low yielding Japanese Yen and using them to acquire riskier assets – has been increasingly employed by speculators since the 1990s, and appears to have played a key role in the speculative period of 2004-2008.

Speculators engaging in this activity are taking risks (sometimes massive risks) with (for the most part) Other People’s Money (OPM). When it works, they return the borrowed funding currency plus interest, and pocket the difference. When it goes terribly wrong, you wind down operations and hide from your creditors behind a corporate liability shield, forcing them to write down the value of their loans to you (their funding currency assets).

Nice work if you can get it, and amazingly, investment banks and their subsidiaries have been falling all over themselves to make these loans to privileged clients — including their own proprietary desks and funds — since the late 1990s (in competitive strategy, herd pursuit of bad ideas is usually a sign of an over crowded industry).

Better yet for the carry traders, increasingly lax financial regulation has allowed speculators to lever their carry up to levels not seen before in modern history, meaning they can borrow more money for a given level of collateral, and/or purchase more assets with a given amount of funding currency.

As some of those trades started to go bad in 2008, the result was a breathtakingly sharp and sudden reversal in the key funding currency, the Yen. This can be seen in the circled graph below, along with the following observations:

• The rate of appreciation in the Yen was far greater in 2008 than in the 1997 and 1998 global financial crises. The left most graph shows foreign exchange movements between the Yen and thirty three other currencies during the Asian crisis of 1997. Clearly, forex movements in that crisis were country specific.
• The middle graph shows currency movements against the Yen during the 1998 crisis associated with the Russian sovereign debt default. The appearance of a positive slope is apparent, implying that forex dislocations were due more to speculative behaviors including the rising use of leverage than to country-specific risks (for that we can probably thank the pioneering geniuses at LTCM and their investment bank benefactors).
• The third graph shows the appreciation of the Yen during the recent global financial crisis. The slope, which gives an idea of how sharply the Yen appreciated against those 33 other currencies, is breathtaking. The median interest rate on the target currencies (on the horizontal axis) also appears to have been roughly half of what it was in 1998.

Translating into English, this means that in 2008-09, the Yen appreciated even more sharply than it did in 1998, and against target assets that offered half the expected return of those in 1998. This calls to mind a question we raised recently, which is whether some powerful financial market participants are confusing ”efficient dislocation” with “market efficiency.” That would be understandable after all. History shows that the fatter the economic rents being justified, the more deluded the economic rationales tend to be.

In the BIS paper, the author also notes that carry trade activities are inherently pro-cyclical: borrowing activity tends to push down the market value of the funding currency, while investing activity tends to push up the market value of the target assets, and this will tend to invite increasing levels of speculation until something causes a breakdown.

Higher degrees of leverage make the pro-cyclicality and the eventual fallout that much worse. Unfortunately, while a great deal has been made of John Maynard Keynes’ alleged return in the past year, it appears that the brief 2008-09 resurgence of Hyman Minsky — who warned presciently of such dangers – has already been forgotten.

That “Minsky fade” appears to be supported by the bottom right graph (though admittedly, this case isn’t as strong as the leveraged carry trade evidence discussed above). The negative slope in that graph shows that less than a year later, the Yen depreciated markedly against many currencies, especially against higher yielding target currencies, which runs counter to the aftermath of 1997 and 1998.

The implication is that the Yen carry trade came back on line fairly quickly after financial markets regained their footing. Apparently financial cockroaches are, like their arachnid namesakes, largely immune to the effects of fallout. As described by the BIS author:

…with extreme risk aversion abating, carry trade activity – a relatively risky strategy – may have returned in the second half of 2009. Indeed, carry trades in a number of high-yielding currencies, especially those of commodity exporters, provided extraordinarily high ex post returns over this period. Moreover, near zero interest rates prevailed in many major currencies, increasing ex ante profitability not only for traditional funding currencies such as the yen. Carry-to-risk ratios support this conclusion…

A a critically important aspect of this issue is financial regulatory reform. Very little has been done from a regulatory standpoint to bring down the astronomical leverage that was available for carry trade speculation prior to 2008. Yesterday, Larry Summers gave an interview to CNBC in which he emphasized that the scope of the proposed “Volcker Rule” was limited to particular types of banks.

If true, over leveraged areas of global financial markets are likely to continue escaping prudent regulation, which means that the pronounced cycles of euphoria and distress in risky asset classes will continue. While those swings create opportunities for contrarian investors, the dynamic behind them is a zero-sum or even net-negative economic game. In the long run, it causes more economic harm than it’s worth.

And while interest rates have converged substantially since the 1990s, current spreads are likely to persist in the decade ahead for multiple reasons, not least being variation in demographic cycles, which will mean lower nominal rates in most developed countries, and higher rates in most emerging markets.

In other words, the roach bait isn’t going anywhere soon. That means that sound regulation absolutely must fill the void in order for the gains from financial market speculation to approach something resembling a social optimum.

UPDATE 3/2/2010 – AP report on further progress in Senate Finance on financial regulation

URLs:

http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1003f.pdf?noframes=1

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2010/02/wsj-hedge-fund-career-trades/

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100302/ap_on_bi_ge/us_financial_overhaul

Career trades and object lessons

The WSJ carried an interesting story today (subscription required) about hedge fund bearishness on the euro relative to the USD (i.e., a falling euro exchange rate):

Some heavyweight hedge funds have launched large bearish bets against the euro in moves that are reminiscent of the trading action at the height of the U.S. financial crisis.

The big bets are emerging amid gatherings such as an exclusive “idea dinner” earlier this month that included hedge-fund titans SAC Capital Advisors LP and Soros Fund Management LLC. During the dinner, hosted by a boutique investment bank at a private townhouse in Manhattan, a small group of all-star hedge-fund managers argued that the euro is likely to fall to “parity”—or equal on an exchange basis—with the dollar…

Our interest isn’t motivated by the anti-euro call, which is rather conventional and uninteresting (Robert Mundell, one of the intellectual architects of the EMU, has recently predicted movement towards EUR-USD parity, and USD parity is something of an underlying objective of the EMU, if not the ECB).

Rather, it’s in the social and market dynamics involved, and how strongly they illuminate the ongoing importance of financial market regulatory reform.

The WSJ notes that this was an invitation-only event at a private home, and included some major global macro hedge fund players. While that’s not a bad thing per se, it definitely creates some potential market asymmetries and risks:

• Asymmetries to the extent that a small number of players with (relatively) massive amounts of capital and the ability to take highly leveraged bets (that’s the implication of “career trade”) may all be thinking and moving in the same direction; and
• Market and economic risks may because concerted, highly leveraged bets are likely to accelerate what might otherwise be a more orderly return to parity, i.e., one that unfolds over a longer period of time that allows for interested agents to adjust without too much trouble.

That last one is the more interesting point in our opinion, because of what it implies about the theoretical ideal of market efficiency. If EUR-USD is bound to return to parity, is it less destructive to let it “happen naturally”, or is it healthier in the long term to allow levered up speculators to (attempt to) correct mispricings as soon and as quickly as possible?

We have some qualms with the latter approach, because: (1) it may create more market and economic havoc than would otherwise occur; (2) if successful, the “rents” associated with the resulting dislocation (even beyond the mere price adjustment) accrue to a small number of privileged players; and (3) if those bets go badly, the damage could very well spread beyond the hedge funds’ assets (LTCM being the archetypal example).

Of course, those rents accrue to a hedge fund’s passive partners too, so there may be outside institutions that benefit, rather than just the funds’ general partners (emphasis on “may”). But speculators aren’t just messing with an asset class here; they’re impacting the very measuring rods of economic activity and financial obligations, and some of them are able to employ astronomical leverage in doing so, if they desire. 

If the net social costs of that activity are negative, it becomes immaterial who the ultimate beneficiaries of the managing partners’ actions are. It also highlights how critical it is to do regulatory reform well, but soon. Speculators are absolutely critical to financial markets and economies, but optimization requires some degree of financial constraint. How many more ‘object lessons’ will we require on that point?

URLs:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703795004575087741848074392.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Term_Capital_Management

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy.

Greece and Goldman

There’s been a good deal of news swirl about Goldman Sachs’ role in entering into swaps contracts with Greece in order to assist it in “hiding” some of its public debt as it prepared to enter the EMU.

Here’s a good primer from 2003 on these types of swaps, and an interesting thought piece on it from Ed Harrison.

URLs:

http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/1498135/revealed-goldman-sachs-mega-deal-greece

http://seekingalpha.com/article/190390-inside-the-mind-of-an-investment-banker-greece-goldman-and-derivatives

Marshall the Moody’s Mauler

Marshall Auerback offered up a brutal dismantling of rating agencies’ negative outlooks on sovereign debt issuers like Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.

America’s Triple AAA credit rating could be at risk should its nascent economic revival not develop into a full-blown recovery, Moody’s Investor Service warned yesterday…

Sound familiar? The so-called “Big Three” ratings agencies have been making claims like this for years: in Japan, the UK and, now, the United States. It is worth recalling that these are the same organizations which, as recently as 2007, were conferring Triple AAA ratings on subprime mortgage paper…

Unlike Moody’s, we think it is absurd to say that the government is going to ‘run out of money’ as our President has repeated. It is not dependent on China or anyone else. There is no operational limit to how much government can spend, when it wants to spend. This includes making interest payments and Social Security and Medicare and Medicaid payments. It includes all government payments made in dollars to anyone.

And if Moody’s (or any other ratings agency) genuinely thinks that government debt is intrinsically evil and that surpluses should be the stated goal of US government policy (in order to safeguard America’s Triple AAA rating) then it must spell out the full consequences of this policy choice. The ratings agencies appear incapable or (at the very least) unwilling to explain the essential sectoral relationships that link the government, private and external sectors. They seem to think that you can have everything – a budget surplus and high private saving and debt reduction. You cannot as a matter of plain accounting logic unless you suddenly start net exporting in great volumes, (which has not happened to the US in its post W.W. II history), or if the domestic private sector is either choosing to deleverage or use leverage less than in the past, that means it will take large and increasing fiscal deficits, or small and decreasing trade deficits, or some combination of the two, in order to achieve trend real GDP growth paths. Otherwise, the result is stagnation or in the extreme, debt deflation. That will not do much to enhance America’s credit rating.

If there’s one thing that Auerback and his fellow neo-chartalists stand out on, it’s this: rating agencies, policymakers, economists, pundits, and many, many others think and speak about debt, deficits, and money as if the world still operated on some type of commodity standard. It does not. Smaller economies may be forced by circumstance to be on hard currency standards, at least operationally, and that is somewhat analogous to a commodity standard. But there is no compelling reason why any issuer of the world’s major currencies (ex-ECB ) should ever miss a debt payment. It’s preposterous.

And yet people actually buy protection against default on U.S. treasury debt via credit default swaps (CDS)! That’s a financial snake oil that comes with potentially significant economic costs. Here’s why:

• Holders of Treasury debt are giving away money to the counter parties selling CDS protection.*
• If it were possible for the U.S. government to default, what counter party could possibly cover its obligations? Diligence schmiligence?
• Leverage, insufficient regulation, and herding behavior have actually made the long CDS trade a winner at times over the past several years.
• That means a greater amount of capital becomes (mis)allocated to people who have done nothing to improve overall economic well-being.
• Those winners will suffer delusions of genius, which almost guarantees they’ll make bad decisions in the future.
• If those bad decisions are levered highly enough, their errors will have systemic implications.
• Add opportunity costs to the risk of systemic damage and the net long term social costs of such behavior are almost certainly negative.

* It might not seem like much — at 50 basis points it costs $50,000 to “insure” $10MM of Treasury debt — but if we assume, for example, that a pension fund is on the long side of the swap, it’s giving away the equivalent of one or two pensioners’ incomes. And while it might look like a good move as long as speculation in Treasury CDS continues to run, the real economic value is ZERO, for the reasons outlined by Auerback.

URLs:

http://www.newdeal20.org/?p=8162

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0524400220100205?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a49:g43:r1:c1.000000:b30347234:z0

Auerback on Greece

Marshall Auerback offers an assessment of the brewing rescue package for Greece. It echoes some of the observations we recently offered about the EMU:

The insanity of self-imposed budgetary constraints will be manifest to all soon enough. Economists and the EU bureaucrats who advocate a slavish adherence to arbitrary compliance numbers fail to comprehend the basis of government spending. In imposing these voluntary financial constraints on government activity, they deny essential government services and the opportunity for full employment to their citizenry.

Score another one, then, for the high priests of fiscal rectitude. Harsh cuts, tax increases — this is by no means a recovery policy. The capital markets have got their pound of flesh. But Greece is no more able to reduce its deficit under these circumstances than it is possible to get blood out of a stone. Politically, it means ceding control of EU macro policy to an external consortium dominated by France and Germany. Greece becomes a colony.

EMU members do indeed give up a significant degree of control over macro policy. The expected tradeoff is that they’ll enjoy lower financing costs and deepening credit and other financial markets. But the balkanization of fiscal policy poses severe challenges – especially when pessimistic expectations dominate.

There’s an interesting caveat about Greece that could undermine Auerback’s ‘national suicide pact’ assessment. According to Ajay Kapur, Greece has the most attractive demographic profile in Europe (Ireland’s isn’t bad either). If Kapur’s predictions are borne out, then Greece should be A-OK in the decade ahead. In ten years they might even be able to contribute to a bailout of one or more of today’s ’colonizers’!!??

URLs:

http://www.newdeal20.org/?p=8251

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2010/02/global-sell-off-and-the-emu/

http://investments.miraeasset.us/en/ourMarkets/outlookView.do?board_id=1125&group_id=1&pageNo=1

Global sell off and the EMU

Markets for risky assets — stocks, commodities — are down significantly around the world today. The selling is reportedly being caused by intensifying worries over government debt levels in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland (the so-called PIIGS), and the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis for one or more of them. The USD is up, continuing its months long rally.

The European Monetary Union is an interesting contrast to the U.S. It shares a common currency, the euro, which is analogous to the USD here. The governing agreements of the EMU require that each member state impose a certain level of fiscal discipline, i.e., government budget constraints. That’s the nominal policy, but imposing discipline on member countries has proven to be elusive. The important difference between the U.S. and the EMU is that our federal government sets both fiscal and (quasi-public) monetary policies at a national level, while in the EMU, monetary policy is set at the highest level, but fiscal policies are pursued by individual countries, and they can vary quite a bit, from German thrift to PIIGS’ profligacy (there also tend to be tighter constraints on state and local budget deficits in the U.S. than in some European countries). The result is that national governments in the EMU do not have the power to create the non-interest bearing debt (the euro) used to service their interest bearing debt. Technically, the U.S. doesn’t either, as the Fed is not a government agency, but it’s fair to say that Congress and the Administration wield far more power over the Federal Reserve than European governments do over the ECB. 

So when highly leveraged sovereigns in Europe run into trouble, like Portugal’s recent failed debt auction, there’s plenty of consternation and conflict among EMU members about the appropriate measures to take. That uncertainty may indeed be causing increased investor pessimism, and raising the probability that one or more of these countries defaults on its debt.

A CNBC commentator also pointed out that credit default swaps, the cause of AIG’s demise, could be playing a role. This market is still largely unregulated, unfortunately. If a CDS were nothing more than a betting contract between gamblers, they wouldn’t be a big deal. But the CDS market is huge. It has gone well beyond its primary purpose of hedging credit risk, instead allowing active and highly levered speculation on credit troubles, and the ‘notional’ value of contracts far exceeds the actual amount of debt outstanding. Many of the counter parties involved in the CDS market are intimately tied to the global payments system, so an implosion affects all of us. It’s for that reason that updated financial regulation is so critical, whether it’s to tax principal trading assets, limit the level of credit default insurance to the actual level of an issuer’s debt, limit or monitor systemic leverage, etc.

That segues into an important consideration regarding the potential economic impact of a sovereign debt crisis. Some analysts and commentators point out that the economies of the countries at risk are a small percentage of global or even European GDP. However, Lehman Brothers was also small relative to world or U.S. GDP. What’s important from a systemic standpoint is the number of financial commitments associated with the sovereign paper that is at risk of defaulting, i.e., the systemic fragility that could be exposed by such an outcome. The global financial system has deleveraged significantly since 2007, but from astronomical levels; a large loss on sovereign paper could still destroy a lot of capital in fairly short order. There’s also contagion risk — if more than one of these sovereigns were to default, the relative size of the problem would be larger.

Interestingly, we’re bullish on all but one of these countries in the longer term, so we’re looking for opportunity amid the crisis.  

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is an Amazon.com associate, and earns a commission on sales generated through links from our website. At the time of writing, the firm, its principals, and its clients did not own any securities mentioned, or any securities issued by entities mentioned.

Obama Budget & 4Q09 GDP

We were feeling a little smug about Friday morning’s GDP print, given our argument in 2H09 that growth prospects were probably being under estimated. At 5.7%, it wasn’t quite the six handle that we thought we might see, but barring any significant downward revisions, it was closer than most expected, and nominal GDP did indeed have a six handle.

Interestingly, headline government spending added little to the quarter’s numbers, so there will be an interesting debate over how much of a role ‘fiscal demand’ is playing, but we’re cautious about that for a few reasons. First, the slower pace at which private inventories were liquidated was a large contributor to GDP, but sustainable private sector growth and employment are unlikely as long as inventory building remains anemic.  Second, federal spending was down due to a lower defense spend, while non-defense spending was up 8% versus 7% in 3Q09, so it’s hard to argue there was no fiscal component. Third, it ignores the possibility of lag effects between public sector spending or deficits and subsequent private sector activity. And if we’re right that fiscal expenditures are still playing a role, the GDP data could imply a very healthy multiplier, a possibility sketched out in this recent academic paper.

This leads us to the Obama budget released today, which will be a real tooth gnashing, garment rending piece of work to many. But it looks pretty good to us at first glance (see the criteria on page six of this Idle Speculator), far better than recent rhetoric led us to expect. The deficit is forecast to be a record $1.56T in 2010 and to remain above $1T in 2011, and it’s beginning to appear that Obama is “triangulating” on fiscal austerity measures, or at least on the time frame over which deficit reduction will occur (though it’s not clear how PAYGO fits into this).

The President’s budget will be tough for some to swallow, but as we’ve pointed out elsewhere, the belief that government is always and everywhere the problem, or that it cannot contribute to real economic growth, is based on a massive underlying assumption: that the private sector is always and everywhere able to grow. It’s not hard to reduce that position to an absurd one, e.g., if a natural or biological calamity were to severely impact private sector potential, a government with a monopoly over money creation could pick up some or perhaps all of the slack.

Reality is far more complicated of course, but since demographic ratios came to our attention, it seems patently clear that private sector potential can vary wildly over multi decade periods, especially in economies where a steep fall in childhood mortality occurred at some point in history. Japan is the most recent example of a two decade downswing in potential output, and its policymakers mistakenly approached the problem as a cyclical rather than a secular one. The U.S. and other western nations are roughly ten years behind Japan in demographic terms, so there’s still roughly a decade of slow, no, or even negative growth ahead of us, barring an active public sector (note: “active” can include tax cuts). As we wrote last November:

We’re familiar with the major [economic] catechisms; we’re just not sure that the evidence supports any one of them over another. Structural economic conditions can and do change — age structure is just one example of how this can come about — and different conditions may call for different approaches.

There are several economic measures that, when viewed over the last two decades, support our assessment that demographics are playing a powerful role in the performance of the U.S. economy (and by extension, these measures tend to undermine arguments against Republican budget profligacy in the 2000s). For example:

The year over year decline in state and local income tax revenue has never been so precipitous, and it has become far more volatile since demographic ratios first turned negative in the late 1990s;

The trend in real private inventories has also been declining since the late 1990s; and 

Equipment and software investment has been in a similar downtrend since the late 1990s.

Admittedly, we’re just eyeballing graphs here and speculating on whether they correspond well to more robust empirical analyses. But we’re fairly confident in our speculation, and this has led us to accept that we are in a Keynesian moment, or more accurately, two Keynesian decades with a Minskian moment in the middle. In such an environment, where private sector expectations are pessimistic, the optimal response is for the public sector to pick up the slack in consumption, investment, and intermediation, within the constraints set by inflation expectations (granted, inflation is a messier issue in a world where the USD is the global reserve currency, and based on a first cut view of today’s budget, we believe our tradable goods inflation thesis is back in play).

The Obama budget appears to pick up a healthy measure of private sector slack, and should thus be favorable overall for employment, asset prices, and economic output. The inflation issue will be far more slippery: on the one hand, a well designed federal budget gives the Fed more room to tighten, as private sector expectations improve; on the other, fiscal direction is uncertain, especially beyond 2011, and prone to shocks, so central banks will have to be rather nimble (more nimble than they were in 2003-05 and 2008) to avoid taking an overly easy or tight approach to policy.

Obama’s proposed tax increases on high income households will cause some resentment, but it’s hard to see how the income disparity pendulum could keep swinging on its current arc. The administration might also believe that higher tax rates on higher incomes will be supportive of state and municipal debt financing. We’d feel better about it if there were an accompanying reinvention of the corporate tax code, as we believe that would have some positive second and third order effects on lower and middle class incomes; first order effects could be achieved by instituting a payroll tax holiday as Warren Mosler has suggested.

Unfortunately, we place a zero probability on corporate tax reform happening any time soon (the budget calls for increasing taxes on certain sectors of the economy), and a near zero probability on a long payroll tax holiday. Despite that, the President’s budget does brighten the economic outlook a bit for 2H2010 and 2011, and the possiblity of a double dip might have been pushed back to 2012 or 2013 (which clearly calls the semantics of ”double dip” into question).

URLs:

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~yona/research/Multiplier-version12.pdf 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/02/01/Introducing-the-2011-Budget/

http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20100112.pdf

http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20091109.pdf

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?chart_type=line&s[1][id]=ASLPITAX&s[1][transformation]=pc1

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=CBIC1

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?chart_type=line&s[1][id]=NRIPDC96&s[1][transformation]=pc1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsky_moment

http://moslereconomics.com/2010/01/28/tea-party-plan-for-dems-cut-to-the-front-with-tax-cuts/

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is an Amazon.com associate, and earns a commission on sales generated through links from our website. At the time of writing, the firm, its principals, and its clients did not own any securities mentioned, or any securities issued by entities mentioned.

Dollar Strength & Foreign Credit

We came across an interesting piece on the relationship between the USD and commercial credit activity outside the U.S., as shown in the chart below. The implication, based on a quick and dirty visual analysis, is that if USD strengthening continues (the red line, which is plotted inversely), then foreign commercial paper (the blue line) is likely to contract. In other words, a dearer dollar could spell trouble for foreign economies, and that would have negative implications for economic activity, commodities, and risky assets abroad, all else equal.

This piece of evidence, combined with our strong dollar call yesterday, raises some fascinating possibilities. A rush to the USD was not on many strategists’ radar in 2009, or even to this point in 2010. Judging by markets’ performance today and yesterday, we could be seeing a significant break from those views. Then again, we might just be seeing the first notable stock market correction since last year; a USD squeeze might also be a short lived phenomenon.

We see too many moving parts to make a firm call either way. The markets continue to face the spectre of tightening federal purse strings and a ‘less easy’ Federal Reserve in 2010, and as of this week, they are now sitting in the middle of the open conflict that has broken out between the administration and the financial industry.  

We also see complexities in that battle that make it hard to come down on either side. We offered criticism of Obama’s initial remarks on the financial assets tax, though we later qualified it, and some of his remarks today were spot on. And while government policies and institutions certainly set up incentives to greed and stupidity, the actions embodying greed and stupidity (and the massive trading of rents that did little or nothing — arguably less – for economic welfare) were taken by individuals and organizations in the financial industry. And yet the overall tone of hawkishness from policymakers has negative implications for everyone, regardless of what street they make a living on.

There’s also a little noted irony in the apparent desire of some Democrats to constrain the size and activities of the financial sector. If Ajay Kapur’s research is on the mark, the sector is going to be shrinking in the years ahead regardless of regulatory changes, due to the shrinking ratio of middle aged adults.  A more interesting thing to speculate on, given the continuing centrality of the USD in the global economy, is how well those faster growing regions of the world will cope with tigher global liquidity. 

[UPDATE 1/21/2010 - In a CNBC interview moments ago, House Financial Services Commitee chairman Barney Frank put a far kinder and gentler spin on the recent presidential bluster, saying that a regulatory regime shift would have to be drawn out over several years and do a minimal amount of harm. This appears to have calmed frayed nerves in the market, and is a nifty scoop for Burnett and Cramer. Cramer's inferring that Paul Volcker (a man with a history of bull-in-a-china-shop approaches to policy) has the President's ear, while Frank comes down with the more nuanced regulatory views of Fed and Treasury, which could make for some political drama in the year ahead. It could even be a high stakes game of good cop, bad cop -- time will tell.]

http://shadowcapitalism.com/2010/01/20/the-implications-of-a-dollar-squeeze-on-foreign-banks-credit-access/

http://www.miraeasset.com/data/download.jsp?file_path=upload&file_name=MiraeAsset_TheGlobalInvestigator_20090812.pdf

http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1340630859

http://www.cnbc.com/id/34979114/site/14081545

Idle Speculator: Payrolls, Policies, Politics

Friday morning’s report on the employment situation had a little bit for everyone, bulls and bears alike. November revisions saw the first positive month for payroll growth since the current recession began, and the “less bad” trend remains firmly intact. However, the number of discouraged workers jumped dramatically, and payroll growth is still far too low to significantly bring the unemployment rate to a persistently lower level. While unemployment continues to pose a risk to Democrats in 2010, neither party is making a compelling offer to the electorate at the moment, and both of them are too focused on scapegoating the other. While we expect some positive economic surprises in 2010, the U.S. electorate and economy will remain stuck between an elephant and a donkey for some time.

Continue reading: http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20100112.pdf