Posts tagged: Demographics

Demographics and Employment in Australia

Roubini Global Economics asks in their Daily Top5 email (registration required), “Will Australian Employment Resume Rising?” They note that Australia’s labor market is in fine nick:

Australia’s unemployment rate dropped to 5.3% m/m in January 2010 from 5.5% m/m in December 2009. Employment rose in January, driven by an increase of 15,900 full-time jobs, and the total number of hours worked by Australians dipped 1% on an annual basis. Over the past five months, annualized job growth has been 4.4%, the strongest since April 2005.

We’ve been touting the power of demographic composition quite a bit, so let’s make Australia a quick and dirty test case. Here’s a population pyramid showing the sizes of each age cohort:

File:Population Pyramid- Australia 2005.svg

The three largest cohorts in the ‘bulge’ from age 31 to 45 are just entering their most productive years. That implies that the answer to RGE’s question should be an emphatic “Yes”.

URLs:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Population_Pyramid-_Australia_2005.svg#filelinks (retrieved 2/12/2010)

Auerback on Greece

Marshall Auerback offers an assessment of the brewing rescue package for Greece. It echoes some of the observations we recently offered about the EMU:

The insanity of self-imposed budgetary constraints will be manifest to all soon enough. Economists and the EU bureaucrats who advocate a slavish adherence to arbitrary compliance numbers fail to comprehend the basis of government spending. In imposing these voluntary financial constraints on government activity, they deny essential government services and the opportunity for full employment to their citizenry.

Score another one, then, for the high priests of fiscal rectitude. Harsh cuts, tax increases — this is by no means a recovery policy. The capital markets have got their pound of flesh. But Greece is no more able to reduce its deficit under these circumstances than it is possible to get blood out of a stone. Politically, it means ceding control of EU macro policy to an external consortium dominated by France and Germany. Greece becomes a colony.

EMU members do indeed give up a significant degree of control over macro policy. The expected tradeoff is that they’ll enjoy lower financing costs and deepening credit and other financial markets. But the balkanization of fiscal policy poses severe challenges – especially when pessimistic expectations dominate.

There’s an interesting caveat about Greece that could undermine Auerback’s ‘national suicide pact’ assessment. According to Ajay Kapur, Greece has the most attractive demographic profile in Europe (Ireland’s isn’t bad either). If Kapur’s predictions are borne out, then Greece should be A-OK in the decade ahead. In ten years they might even be able to contribute to a bailout of one or more of today’s ’colonizers’!!??

URLs:

http://www.newdeal20.org/?p=8251

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2010/02/global-sell-off-and-the-emu/

http://investments.miraeasset.us/en/ourMarkets/outlookView.do?board_id=1125&group_id=1&pageNo=1

Krugman vs CNBC

A couple of CNBC commentators ripped Paul Krugman for today’s op-ed on budget deficits, with Rick Santelli saying something about lining a bird cage. We aren’t defending Krugman against charges of self-contradiction or factual inaccuracies, but we are definitely siding with him on the economic substance of his argument (the lonely wingnut’s sojourn continues).

Prevailing rhetoric holds that the U.S. government is over extended, and that there’s precious little room for additional economic stimulus. That would be true if US dollars could only be obtained by taking them from people who have them, or by digging new ones out of the ground. In that case, servicing our debts — both private and public — would be quite burdensome. But the reality is that in a modern monetary system, monetary units are simply ledger entries. Whether carried in hand as a Treasury obligation, or held digitally in a bank account, all dollars are created out of thin air by the Federal Reserve in response to demands of the banking system.

The federal government does not have direct control of the Federal Reserve, so its control of money creation is only indirect (if Congress wished, it could wrest control of USD creation from the quasi-private Fed, a measure that a small number of radical but diverse members might like to see). But existing arrangements do not change the basic fact that the U.S. has the capacity to print the money (the non-interest bearing debt) used to service its public debt. That means that the only meaningful constraint on the level of our pubic debt is people’s willingness to accept the USD. And despite the sophomoric rhetoric on that point, people are still overwhelmingly willing to accept USDs.

The claim that Congress is “spending money that we don’t have” is even more egregious. To reiterate: if USDs could only be dug out of the ground, or pulled out of taxpayers’ pockets, then the argument might make some sense. But as long as we have the ability to create USDs out of thin air, then Congress has the ability to spend new USDs instead of existing ones.

The conservative argument against this type of Keynesian activism rests on a couple of key pillars, and under certain conditions, they’re valid: (1) as long as government constraints on the private sector are moderate, an economy will grow at or near full capacity; (2) public demand for capital will always tend to ‘crowd out’ private sector borrowing; and (3) public sector allocation of capital is inevitably distorted, which imposes long run economic costs. 

As long as those assumptions are valid, then Congressional thrift, beyond a basic level of social insurance and national defense spending, is a desirable objective. However:

(1) History doesn’t lend strong support to the idea that an unbridled private sector will always and everywhere produce positive growth; and if monetary policy is constrained by a zero bound (i.e., interest rates can’t go below zero), then whenever growth is below potential, fiscal stimulus is appropriate (and can be enacted in myriad ways that appeal to lefties or righties). This is especially true for long economic cycles, such as the Great Depression, Japan from 1989 until 2008 or so, and several developed western economies since roughly 1999. Judging by the available empirical research, demographic composition could be the main driver of these cycles (and if the effect is strong enough, it might deemphasize the importance of rationality vs behavioralism in theory and policy making).

(2) When private sector demand for capital is contracting, as can happen in a long down cycle, then public sector demand for capital (i.e., deficits and debt issuance) is beneficial, and should foster rather than crowd out private sector credit demand. However, under certain conditions, this will only work if money creation is supportive of public sector credit demand, i.e, if new money is created to finance the public sector debt (the conservative point of view tends to see this as banana republic monetary policy, but that isn’t always the case). Today, banks are taking advantage of a steep yield curve to borrow funds from the Federal Reserve (which creates new USDs) to purchase higher yielding Treasury debt, i.e., a significant amount of our public debt is being ‘monetized’. While that would be a bad thing in an inflationary environment, it’s a good thing when it offsets deflationary forces. Almost everyone who parrots the prevailing rhetoric is overlooking this dynamic.

(3) Public sector capital allocation is certainly prone to distortion in as much as it is not subjected to competition and the judgement of diverse agents. But asymmetries in the private sector can have powerfully negative effects too (financial crisis, anyone?). And while there’s room in our political system for new institutions designed to allocate public resources more optimally, the existing ones, such as voting, negotiation, and oversight, should do a good enough job in the meantime.

Krugman wrote that “there’s no reason to panic about budget prospects for the next few years, or even for the next decade,” and apparently this has some pundits and analysts pulling their hair out. But if prevailing demographic ratios are going to drive another decade of subpar economic outcomes…then he’s absolutely right!  

When the real economy is humming along, we can leave the creation and allocation of new USDs to the private sector, and rein in public deficits without doing too much harm. But when the state of the real economy is uncertain, as it certainly is now (pun intended), the refusal to finance public spending, investment, and intermediation via the creation of new dollars (within the constraints dictated by inflation objectives and expectations) is inherently deflationary and destructive. And that is what undermines the sophomoric notion that we are “leaving a mountain of debt to our grandchildren.” If the public sector is not active enough to offset destructive forces acting in the economy today, then our grandchildren will be worse off. Like most economic variables, public debt levels mean nothing in isolation. And we shouldn’t just look at it relative to current GDP. We must also look at it relative to opportunity cost, or looked at another way, to future GDP. There are actions that the public sector can take today to favorably impact GDP in the future, but they all require financing, including deficit spending. We should only be frightened of deficits when they are scarier than the opportunity costs imposed by government saving. Today, that is simply not the case.

So Krugman is right to be concerned about the policy outlook, which he has a rather pessimistic view of:

Washington now has its priorities all wrong: all the talk is about how to shave a few billion dollars off government spending, while there’s hardly any willingness to tackle mass unemployment. Policy is headed in the wrong direction — and millions of Americans will pay the price.

We’ve expressed similar concerns since 2H09, but it now looks to us as though the Obama administration is “triangulating” on deficits and the federal debt, with no intention to substantially withdraw fiscal stimulus in the government’s 2011 fiscal year (though again, we’re still trying to figure out how the president’s emphasis on PAYGO fits into this). If we’re right, then the readjustments underway in exchange rates, specifically the Euro and USD, are being driven by the Euro and sovereign debt concerns, rather than from the USD side. That means we should settle into a new exchange rate equilibrium in the coming weeks, at which point risky assets should start to recover. It’s going to be a bumpy ride, but we’ll get there.

URLs:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/opinion/05krugman.html

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is an Amazon.com associate, and earns a commission on sales generated through links from our website. At the time of writing, the firm, its principals, and its clients did not own any securities mentioned, or any securities issued by entities mentioned.

Obama Budget & 4Q09 GDP

We were feeling a little smug about Friday morning’s GDP print, given our argument in 2H09 that growth prospects were probably being under estimated. At 5.7%, it wasn’t quite the six handle that we thought we might see, but barring any significant downward revisions, it was closer than most expected, and nominal GDP did indeed have a six handle.

Interestingly, headline government spending added little to the quarter’s numbers, so there will be an interesting debate over how much of a role ‘fiscal demand’ is playing, but we’re cautious about that for a few reasons. First, the slower pace at which private inventories were liquidated was a large contributor to GDP, but sustainable private sector growth and employment are unlikely as long as inventory building remains anemic.  Second, federal spending was down due to a lower defense spend, while non-defense spending was up 8% versus 7% in 3Q09, so it’s hard to argue there was no fiscal component. Third, it ignores the possibility of lag effects between public sector spending or deficits and subsequent private sector activity. And if we’re right that fiscal expenditures are still playing a role, the GDP data could imply a very healthy multiplier, a possibility sketched out in this recent academic paper.

This leads us to the Obama budget released today, which will be a real tooth gnashing, garment rending piece of work to many. But it looks pretty good to us at first glance (see the criteria on page six of this Idle Speculator), far better than recent rhetoric led us to expect. The deficit is forecast to be a record $1.56T in 2010 and to remain above $1T in 2011, and it’s beginning to appear that Obama is “triangulating” on fiscal austerity measures, or at least on the time frame over which deficit reduction will occur (though it’s not clear how PAYGO fits into this).

The President’s budget will be tough for some to swallow, but as we’ve pointed out elsewhere, the belief that government is always and everywhere the problem, or that it cannot contribute to real economic growth, is based on a massive underlying assumption: that the private sector is always and everywhere able to grow. It’s not hard to reduce that position to an absurd one, e.g., if a natural or biological calamity were to severely impact private sector potential, a government with a monopoly over money creation could pick up some or perhaps all of the slack.

Reality is far more complicated of course, but since demographic ratios came to our attention, it seems patently clear that private sector potential can vary wildly over multi decade periods, especially in economies where a steep fall in childhood mortality occurred at some point in history. Japan is the most recent example of a two decade downswing in potential output, and its policymakers mistakenly approached the problem as a cyclical rather than a secular one. The U.S. and other western nations are roughly ten years behind Japan in demographic terms, so there’s still roughly a decade of slow, no, or even negative growth ahead of us, barring an active public sector (note: “active” can include tax cuts). As we wrote last November:

We’re familiar with the major [economic] catechisms; we’re just not sure that the evidence supports any one of them over another. Structural economic conditions can and do change — age structure is just one example of how this can come about — and different conditions may call for different approaches.

There are several economic measures that, when viewed over the last two decades, support our assessment that demographics are playing a powerful role in the performance of the U.S. economy (and by extension, these measures tend to undermine arguments against Republican budget profligacy in the 2000s). For example:

The year over year decline in state and local income tax revenue has never been so precipitous, and it has become far more volatile since demographic ratios first turned negative in the late 1990s;

The trend in real private inventories has also been declining since the late 1990s; and 

Equipment and software investment has been in a similar downtrend since the late 1990s.

Admittedly, we’re just eyeballing graphs here and speculating on whether they correspond well to more robust empirical analyses. But we’re fairly confident in our speculation, and this has led us to accept that we are in a Keynesian moment, or more accurately, two Keynesian decades with a Minskian moment in the middle. In such an environment, where private sector expectations are pessimistic, the optimal response is for the public sector to pick up the slack in consumption, investment, and intermediation, within the constraints set by inflation expectations (granted, inflation is a messier issue in a world where the USD is the global reserve currency, and based on a first cut view of today’s budget, we believe our tradable goods inflation thesis is back in play).

The Obama budget appears to pick up a healthy measure of private sector slack, and should thus be favorable overall for employment, asset prices, and economic output. The inflation issue will be far more slippery: on the one hand, a well designed federal budget gives the Fed more room to tighten, as private sector expectations improve; on the other, fiscal direction is uncertain, especially beyond 2011, and prone to shocks, so central banks will have to be rather nimble (more nimble than they were in 2003-05 and 2008) to avoid taking an overly easy or tight approach to policy.

Obama’s proposed tax increases on high income households will cause some resentment, but it’s hard to see how the income disparity pendulum could keep swinging on its current arc. The administration might also believe that higher tax rates on higher incomes will be supportive of state and municipal debt financing. We’d feel better about it if there were an accompanying reinvention of the corporate tax code, as we believe that would have some positive second and third order effects on lower and middle class incomes; first order effects could be achieved by instituting a payroll tax holiday as Warren Mosler has suggested.

Unfortunately, we place a zero probability on corporate tax reform happening any time soon (the budget calls for increasing taxes on certain sectors of the economy), and a near zero probability on a long payroll tax holiday. Despite that, the President’s budget does brighten the economic outlook a bit for 2H2010 and 2011, and the possiblity of a double dip might have been pushed back to 2012 or 2013 (which clearly calls the semantics of ”double dip” into question).

URLs:

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~yona/research/Multiplier-version12.pdf 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/02/01/Introducing-the-2011-Budget/

http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20100112.pdf

http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20091109.pdf

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?chart_type=line&s[1][id]=ASLPITAX&s[1][transformation]=pc1

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=CBIC1

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?chart_type=line&s[1][id]=NRIPDC96&s[1][transformation]=pc1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsky_moment

http://moslereconomics.com/2010/01/28/tea-party-plan-for-dems-cut-to-the-front-with-tax-cuts/

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES: Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is a state registered investment advisor. The foregoing information is for informational, educational, or entertainment purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell any security, or to engage in any investment strategy. Symmetry Capital Management, LLC is an Amazon.com associate, and earns a commission on sales generated through links from our website. At the time of writing, the firm, its principals, and its clients did not own any securities mentioned, or any securities issued by entities mentioned.

Bookstaber: ‘Controlled Burn’

Rick Bookstaber put forth an interesting argument about easing debt burdens on the public and private sectors through “controlled burn” inflation. If creditors aren’t willing to take large enough haircuts, that’s pretty much what you have to do to get aggregate credit burdens to a more manageable or desirable level.

There are a lot of misperceptions around this issue. FDR allegedly devalued the dollar c. 1934 by repegging it to gold at $35, instead of the $20 that prevailed before WWI. But if you look at the historical data, the USD was powerfully deflationary in the years leading up that action. And at best, the repegging only stemmed the rate of deflation. It did not create any inflation at all. In fact, the more closely we look at the data, the more closely aligned we become with folks who argue that the New Deal didn’t go far enough.  Paul Krugman’s warning in 2008 is looking fairly prescient:

…Barack Obama should learn from F.D.R.’s failures as well as from his achievements: the truth is that the New Deal wasn’t as successful in the short run as it was in the long run. And the reason for F.D.R.’s limited short-run success, which almost undid his whole program, was the fact that his economic policies were too cautious.

[I would add that other FDR actions were too bullheaded and hasty, errors that Obama also risks repeating.]

During the recent crisis and recession, plenty of pundits argued that USD devaluation would be the order of the day. We saw some risk of that, but not as much as those who pointed repeatedly to the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented balance sheet expansion of 2008-2009, or the federal government’s enlarged deficits. That’s because those factors are meaningless if the private sector is not taken into account (i.e., the effects of monetary policy and public and private sector borrowing are not independent). If there’s intensive deleveraging and a rising desire for saving in the private sector, then expansive actions by the central bank and federal government are merely going to absorb some slack. Ony if they absorb more slack than exists will there be any risk of inflation.

Unfortunately, of late, the messages coming out of almost all political quarters is that the slack in the real economy is going to increase — and that means higher deflationary risk, and conversely to Bookstaber’s argument, rising real credit burdens. That, in turn, will lead to credit after shocks and rising unemployment. Granted, to the extent that people’s nominal income stays the same, real incomes rise in a deflationary environment, so this would be good news for pensioners, savers, and highly valued employees. But we shouldn’t overlook the real opportunity costs that deflation implies.

We see a threat of increasing slack because there’s a rising chorus of fiscal hawkishness all around us. Today, Rep. Chris Van Hollen, chairman of the Democratic caucus, told a CNBC interviewer that the government ”need[s] to get every penny back” from TARP. Yesterday, Republican Rep. Jeb Hensarling said that the election of Scott Brown was a sign that voters cared about debt and deficits (to be fair, he did mention lowering capital gains and payroll taxes, but debt and deficits seemed to be on the top of his mind). Today, a CNBC commentator referred to “your [taxpayers'] money” leading into a report on pending transportation spending. Policymakers are treading the line between semi-sensibility and madness.

First, Congress and the Administration should look forward. That requires changing the regulatory framework in a way that will prevent excessive systemic fragility in the future, and that’s the direction that Obama laid out in his remarks yesterday, with Paul Volcker, who imposed a massive deflationary contraction as Fed chairman in the early 1980s,  smiling in the background. But all else equal, this will lower overall credit capacity, and demanding full repayment of TARP will will make it worse. In order to avoid a double dip, the federal government has to act as the borrower of last resort, i.e., run larger deficits. To us, that’s the real problem with the path being laid out by Obama and Democratic leaders — taking with one hand, and not giving with the other, means economic contraction, all else equal.

Second, debt and deficit hawkishness could not be more untimely. We should pay serious attention to where and how public expenditures are directed, but we need to be honest about the need for significant deficit financed expenditures. Looking at underlying demographic structure, we probably shouldn’t concern ourselves with lowering the federal debt until the end of this coming decade.

Finally, the dollar is ”our money” in the sense that we use it to pay our tax liabilities to a government that has monopoly power to create it. Better yet, it creates it out of thin air (yes, if that power is abused or misused, it can lead to inflation, even hyperinflation, but the risk of such an outcome right now is very, very low). If fiscal policy does indeed swing in a more hawkish direction, then there’s going to be a surfeit of monetary units. And the more we taxpayers or our elected representatives grab for ”our money”, the worse it’s going to get. This ‘chartalist’ view is also somewhat complicated by the fact that our money creation process is controlled by the quasi-public Federal Reserve system. That means that the federal government can only issue interest bearing debt to finance its deficits. It sells those securities to primary dealer banks at auction. And the primary dealers rely on the Federal Reserve system to create the monetary units (the non-interest bearing debt of the U.S. government) that are used to purchase its interest bearing debt.

Keeping those last three sentences in mind, consider that:

  • The President intends to tighten the tax and regulatory collars on the banks
  • Fed Chairman Bernanke’s confirmation by the Senate is now in serious doubt
  • Government spending and investment are especially critical in this recession (see here and here)
  • Policymakers are clearly signalling that they’re going to get serious about “fiscal responsibility” 

The clear implication is that USDs are more likely to increase in value. So while Rick Bookstaber is right about the ability of inflation to lower existing debt burdens, it looks to us like we’re headed in the opposite direction, at least for now. The consequences will be discouraging to just about everybody.

URLs:

http://rick.bookstaber.com/2010/01/controlled-burn-inflation.html

http://www.aei.org/article/26390

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/opinion/10krugman.html

http://research.stlouisfed.com/recession/gdpdata.html

http://research.stlouisfed.com/recession/indicators.html

Dollar Strength & Foreign Credit

We came across an interesting piece on the relationship between the USD and commercial credit activity outside the U.S., as shown in the chart below. The implication, based on a quick and dirty visual analysis, is that if USD strengthening continues (the red line, which is plotted inversely), then foreign commercial paper (the blue line) is likely to contract. In other words, a dearer dollar could spell trouble for foreign economies, and that would have negative implications for economic activity, commodities, and risky assets abroad, all else equal.

This piece of evidence, combined with our strong dollar call yesterday, raises some fascinating possibilities. A rush to the USD was not on many strategists’ radar in 2009, or even to this point in 2010. Judging by markets’ performance today and yesterday, we could be seeing a significant break from those views. Then again, we might just be seeing the first notable stock market correction since last year; a USD squeeze might also be a short lived phenomenon.

We see too many moving parts to make a firm call either way. The markets continue to face the spectre of tightening federal purse strings and a ‘less easy’ Federal Reserve in 2010, and as of this week, they are now sitting in the middle of the open conflict that has broken out between the administration and the financial industry.  

We also see complexities in that battle that make it hard to come down on either side. We offered criticism of Obama’s initial remarks on the financial assets tax, though we later qualified it, and some of his remarks today were spot on. And while government policies and institutions certainly set up incentives to greed and stupidity, the actions embodying greed and stupidity (and the massive trading of rents that did little or nothing — arguably less – for economic welfare) were taken by individuals and organizations in the financial industry. And yet the overall tone of hawkishness from policymakers has negative implications for everyone, regardless of what street they make a living on.

There’s also a little noted irony in the apparent desire of some Democrats to constrain the size and activities of the financial sector. If Ajay Kapur’s research is on the mark, the sector is going to be shrinking in the years ahead regardless of regulatory changes, due to the shrinking ratio of middle aged adults.  A more interesting thing to speculate on, given the continuing centrality of the USD in the global economy, is how well those faster growing regions of the world will cope with tigher global liquidity. 

[UPDATE 1/21/2010 - In a CNBC interview moments ago, House Financial Services Commitee chairman Barney Frank put a far kinder and gentler spin on the recent presidential bluster, saying that a regulatory regime shift would have to be drawn out over several years and do a minimal amount of harm. This appears to have calmed frayed nerves in the market, and is a nifty scoop for Burnett and Cramer. Cramer's inferring that Paul Volcker (a man with a history of bull-in-a-china-shop approaches to policy) has the President's ear, while Frank comes down with the more nuanced regulatory views of Fed and Treasury, which could make for some political drama in the year ahead. It could even be a high stakes game of good cop, bad cop -- time will tell.]

http://shadowcapitalism.com/2010/01/20/the-implications-of-a-dollar-squeeze-on-foreign-banks-credit-access/

http://www.miraeasset.com/data/download.jsp?file_path=upload&file_name=MiraeAsset_TheGlobalInvestigator_20090812.pdf

http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1340630859

http://www.cnbc.com/id/34979114/site/14081545

A Strong Dollar Call

President Obama, continuing his recent streak of verbal fiscal hawkishness (our view is admittedly contrarian) signed a memorandum today regarding tax delinquencies among government contractors. To the extent that federal contracts are awared to tax evaders and tax cheats due to poor information sharing or availability, this is a good initiative, and it’s based on analyses from the GAO like this one.

It was the President’s remarks that were most telling, especially his argument that the federal government needs to align itself with the values and norms that tax paying households live by (of course, this completely ignores the fact that only the federal government can create the money required to fulfill tax, debt, and other financial obligations, not just of the public sector, but of the private sector as well). The underlying message of recent remarks by the President is that tightening via “fiscal discipline” is very likely in the months and years ahead; Obama is clearly signalling that he has staked out a very center-right position among Democrats, similar to the Blue Dogs and Democratic Leadership Council, as summed up in this recent piece by Harold Ford, Jr:

The ability of the private sector to produce new jobs — our economic future — depends on how quickly we can get back on the path to fiscal responsibility. This means that any health-care reform plan should be paid for — a promise that President Obama has made, and one that his predecessor should have made.

Ford’s assertions are based on the rather shaky assumption that they hold under all economic conditions. But as we’ve noted recently, there are only some environments where this holds true, while there are other environments where it does not. In the former, fiscal conservatism may be appropriate due to “crowding out” and other concerns. In the latter, the private sector’s capacity to produce jobs actually depends on public sector demand, investment, and intermediation, i.e., deficits. 

Most people, Ford included, accept this idea in the short run, e.g., during a financial crisis or a sharp economic downturn. But what we’re arguing, essentially, is that pessimistic expectations are sometimes rational, and that the factors driving them can theoretically remain in force over fairly long cycles of ten, twenty, or thirty years, even longer.  In the situation at hand, when we look at demographic shifts in the U.S. and residual damage from the financial crisis, we think the decade ahead will be of the latter variety in both the U.S. and mature European economies.  So the message of Ford, his fellow Blue Dogs, the DLC, and President Obama (especially of late) might be a suboptimal direction for policy, however well it might have worked in the 1980s and 1990s. [1/20/2010 UPDATE - well written piece here on how public thinking about policy is heavily informed by experiences since the 1980s, which might be akin to driving by the rear view mirror]

As a result, we now see several forces at work that lead us to expect a strengthening USD, all else equal. First, the prevailing view among Democrats appears to be that voters will favor fiscal hawks in midterm elections, and they will respond accordingly. Second, we expect upside volatility in the real economy in 2010 (due in no small part to public sector demand), which will relax pressures for additional fiscal stimulus. Third, invoking the ideas of the neo-Chartalists, we’d argue that when the federal government places a high value on “fiscal responsibility” or “fiscal conservatism”, it implies that monetary units are going to become more scarce, and thus more valuable. In other words, if the President’s recent signalling is sincere, the USD is likely to appreciate (as will Treasuries, despite their compressed yields), and commodities and other carry trade and risky assets are likely to suffer (today’s market movements seem to support this argument).

While most pundits are attributing today’s market developments to the Republican capture of Kennedy’s senate seat yesterday, and/or to policy tightening in China, which are almost certainly factors, we would argue that far too many are overlooking the impact that President Obama’s current policy tenor is having on the USD. He’s essentially promising that the “tokens” required to settle economic transactions and engage in productive activity are going to become scarcer.

This implies some important changes in who the marginal actors are in the political economy. After the 2008 election, we asserted that the Blue Dogs would be the marginal player in setting the course of economic policy. The President’s upcoming budget will give us a clearer idea of whether their fiscal conservatism, as Obama’s current rhetoric implies, has indeed become dominant. If it has, then we think the Fed becomes the marginal factor in policy direction and economic outcomes. How soon and how sharply they tighten will determine the risk of a 1937 or Japan style recession, and it will also have critical implications for the performance of emerging market equities and other risky assets in the short to intermediate term.

URLs:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-and-agencies-1

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07742t.pdf

http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=255070&kaid=85&subid=65

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chartalism

http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp-pdf/WP10-Wray.pdf

President Still on Message…and It’s a Costly One

President Obama stumped over the weekend for Martha Coakley, who is running for Ted Kennedy’s vacant Senate seat against GOP upstart Scott Brown. He echoed his recent hawkishness, pitting green jobs against the oil industry, and taxpayers against “fat cat” Wall Street bankers, repeating his “I’ll get your TARP money back” meme. 

[1/20/2010 UPDATE - In an interview currently running on CNBC, Warren Buffet pointed out that most of the TARP recipient banks have repaid the federal government with interest, and that the industry, via FDIC, has absorbed the losses resulting from bank failures. TARP losses are the result of GSE's like Fannie and Freddie, and AIG, where many stakeholders - not just CDS counter parties, but also insurance settlement and annuity receipients - were paid with TARP funds. Important points, and they make the President's recent TARP rhetoric all the more puzzling.]

Obama’s current approach to policy is a net economic negative that will not reduce unemployment, at least in the short run. It will merely shuffle employment around between industries, creating inefficiencies and piling additional dislocation on top of the residual pain of a deep recession. And preaching to the choir could not have helped Coakley, given that she had lost a double digit poll lead due to migration of moderate and independent voters in recent weeks. Arch lefties are simply not going to swing the special election in Massachusetts, and they are probably not going to swing the 2010 midterm elections. For the second time in the last couple of weeks, we are left to wonder which cabinet member(s) the president is currently getting his strategic and tactical guidance from, and how much it’s going to cost his party before he starts looking for better advice.

We would assert that the Dems have lost a great deal of ground since they and the president began taking a more hawkish fiscal stance, and since PAYGO came back into vogue (though we could be wrong – perceptions of overreaching on health care reform may have been more important, for example). The parties’ current approaches to policy are basically:

Dems:    increased public spending  + higher taxes

GOP:      decreased public spending + lower taxes

It’s interesting to note that in many environments – this one included, we think – those options won’t differ a whole lot in terms of economic output. Thus, the choice may not be about economic performance as much as private versus public control of resources, which seems to be fairly characteristic of the American voter. That’s too bad, as there are some important public sector initiatives, including infrastructure, energy efficiency, gaps in the health care system, even a public employer of last resort, that could and arguably should be undertaken. Unfortunately, every time the President or members of his party claim that the private sector (however narrowly defined and targeted) will be put on the hook for funding some initiative, he shuts down these important opportunities.

As we’ve noted elsewhere, the federal government issues the money used to service its debt. Thus, the only real constraint on public sector deficits is inflation expectations coming unhinged. This has not happened to date, and most forward looking indicators are pointing in a disinflationary if not outright deflationary direction, at least in purely domestic goods and services. This realization offers a less divisive way forward for whichever party grasps it first, i.e.:

Dems:    increased public spending  + increased deficits

GOP:      lower taxes + increased deficits

In what appears to be a  ’Keynesian’ decade ahead, these approaches offer a healthier framework for policymaking. And arguably, the Dem direction – if they had the courage to advocate it, and the sense and restraint to do it reasonably well – would lead to better economic outcomes overall.

Idle Speculator: Payrolls, Policies, Politics

 

Friday morning’s report on the employment situation had a little bit for everyone, bulls and bears alike. November revisions saw the first positive month for payroll growth since the current recession began, and the “less bad” trend remains firmly intact. However, the number of discouraged workers jumped dramatically, and payroll growth is still far too low to significantly bring the unemployment rate to a persistently lower level. While unemployment continues to pose a risk to Democrats in 2010, neither party is making a compelling offer to the electorate at the moment, and both of them are too focused on scapegoating the other. While we expect some positive economic surprises in 2010, the U.S. electorate and economy will remain stuck between an elephant and a donkey for some time.

Continue reading: http://symmetrycapital.net/idlespeculation/20100112.pdf

1937, Public Debt, and Job Creation

CEA chair Christina Romer penned an interesting guest article for The Economist (subscription required) on parallels between the 1937 recession and today (emphasis added):

The recovery from the Depression is often described as slow because America did not return to full employment until after the outbreak of the second world war. But the truth is the recovery in the four years after Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 was incredibly rapid. Annual real GDP growth averaged over 9%. Unemployment fell from 25% to 14%. The second world war aside, the United States has never experienced such sustained, rapid growth.

However, that growth was halted by a second severe downturn in 1937-38, when unemployment surged again to 19%… The fundamental cause of this second recession was an unfortunate, and largely inadvertent, switch to contractionary fiscal and monetary policy.

Romer’s assertion generally comports with a recent paper from the Chicago Federal Reserve, in which Francois Velde found that “monetary and fiscal factors account fairly well for the pattern of [decline in] in industrial production and, in particular, for the depth of the recession.”

These are timely analyses, as debt and deficit phobia appear to be gaining ground inside the Beltway. A notable development is recent bipartisan legislation introduced by Sens. Conrad (D-ND) and Gregg (R-NH) that would establish a ‘fiscal task force’. While this isn’t necessarily a bad idea, it appears to be based on an incomplete understanding of financial principles, and it risks putting fiscal priorities in an order that could cause economic harm in 2011 or 2012.

First, Sen. Gregg’s frequent argument that we should not “saddle” our children or grandchildren with additional debt takes an overly simplistic view of financial principles. Debt levels by themselves don’t typically mean a whole heck of a lot. There are clearly upper limits to how much debt any entity can carry, and the 400% debt-to-GDP figure that Gregg and Conrad are fond of citing might well be it.

But before reaching that point, what matters is the activities that debts are used to finance. For example, at the level of an individual, it makes a big difference whether a person goes into debt to finance things like (1) an expensive new car, flat screen TV and A/V system, and nights out on the town or (2) an education that will enhance their future income. In the first case, the ability of one’s “future self” to service the debt incurred does not improve as a result of the things purchased (though as acquisitive beings we’re very good at justifying them). However, in the second case, the debtor’s ability to service their debt is expected to improve enough to make it not just tolerable but worthwhile

This difference reveals a fundamental tenet of finance; when financing anything, be it an education or a new piece of equipment, the borrower must ask themselves if the expected return on the purchase exceeds the expected cost of the financing. Thus, in financing decisions, whether undertaken in the public or the private sector, the question should not just be “how much debt”, but rather, “how will the debt be used, and is the expected return positive?” Any idea that would leave our children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren better off — the analogues of our “future selves” — should be on the table. And that means that we cannot reflexively dismiss all public measures that would increase federal deficits in the short to intermediate term. Otherwise, we could do as great an injustice to future generations as incurring a massive and wasteful public debt would do.

It seems clear to us, based on current and historical evidence, that we are in a period where the public sector (specifically, the federal government, given its relative scale and, most importantly, its monopoly over money issuance) is the debtor and economic actor at the margin (an assertion that issues like infrastructure disrepair might lend additional support to). But currently, as in 1936, the banking sector and market prices are signaling that there is a relative shortage of public sector credit! Granted, the desire for government paper could be due in part to the pro-cyclical nature of credit markets, and/or international currency interventions. But it might also be an indication that, at the margin, public initiatives present the most attractive financing opportunities right now (an idea that demographic trends seem to lend support to). Of course, that statement will cause our more conservative and libertarian friends to shudder, but we would simply point out that Christina Romer’s claim about the strength of the economic recovery in the 1930s is strongly supported by the data, rather than being informed by a purely ideological slant. Thus, beyond ensuring that sufficient counter cyclical stabilizers remain funded, the primary question that policymakers should be asking is, “How can we best put the proceeds from additional debt issuance to work in improving the country’s future productivity?” If the federal debt begins pushing the limits, it will be reflected in market prices. And to this point, nothing like that has happened.

If our assessment is on target, it raises some important considerations for President Obama’s current ‘job push’, and especially the use of excess TARP funds and the possibility of tax cuts and credits. The President, embodying the tension between fiscal and economic priorities, recently opined that surplus TARP funds (sometimes it’s good to be the ‘investor of last resort’) could be used to provide loans to allow small businesses to hire employees, or to reduce the deficit. More recently, the Administration floated the idea of various tax breaks for small businesses:

To encourage investment by small businesses and improve their access to capital, the administration is…calling for a one-year elimination of the tax on capital gains from new investments in small business stock…for the extension through 2010 of the Recovery Act provision that allows small businesses to immediately expense up to $250,000 of qualified investment…[and] for extending the Recovery Act provision that accelerates the rate at which business can deduct the cost of capital expenditures.

This is good stuff, though it’s fairly low hanging fruit. More important to long run investment and productivity is to make our national tax code less distorting and more competitive.

Obama also wants to make additional investments in roads, bridges, highways, transit, rail, aviation and other infrastructure to encourage job growth. More infrastructure investment projects would be selected on the basis of merit, through a combination of grants and loans.

The president called on Congress to consider a new program to provide rebates for consumers who retrofit their homes for greater energy efficiency. He also wants to expand several oversubscribed Recovery Act programs that have leveraged private investment in energy efficiency to create clean energy manufacturing jobs. Those include industrial energy efficiency investments and tax incentives for investing in renewable manufacturing facilities in the U.S.

Beyond any positive environmental impacts, these measures will improve long run productivity and efficiency. However, Obama has exhibited some conservative tendencies, at least in his words, regarding federal spending. Note the heavy reliance on loans as opposed to grants in the measures above, as well as this statement:

“There is only so much government can do,” said Obama. “Job creation will ultimately depend on the real job creators: businesses across America. But government can help lay the groundwork on which the private sector can better generate jobs, growth and innovation.”

We certainly agree that this is a valid statement most of the time, but we’re not convinced that it’s the case now. Even if GDP and employment do surprise to the upside as we expect in 2010, there will still be plenty of slack in domestic resource utilization. We should be careful not to underestimate the positive impact that the public sector is having on current and planned hiring and investment (of course, we’re also mindful of the uncertainty that policymaking has created in the past days, months, and couple of years). And as we noted recently, if the federal government’s support is given generously enough, it would allow the Federal Reserve a lot more wiggle room to raise rates and stem the increasingly speculative USD carry trade.

URLs:

http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=13856176

http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/ep_4qtr2009_part2_velde.pdf

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/893f01ec-e524-11de-9a25-00144feab49a.html

http://www.webcpa.com/news/Obama-Proposes-Tax-Cuts-Spur-Hiring-52689-1.html

http://www.newsweek.com/id/214096

http://symmetrycapital.net/index.php/blog/2009/11/right-on-cue/