Interesting Political Undercurrents

A couple of obscure news stories today (to US news consumers, at least) provide some important insights into current and historic trends in the global political economy.

First is IHT coverage of the London convention of "Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Party of Liberation, a group that calls for a caliphate in Muslim countries, the end of Israel and the withdrawal of all Western interests in the Middle East." The organization is one that concerns some western governments, though it apparently does not meet the test of a terrorist organization. What was interesting in the story is that the attendees are described as middle class professionals, and one of them offered a quote that echoes what we think is a primary driver of Islamic terrorism:

"If you look at the political structure in the Muslim world, it’s a police state," said Mohammed Baig, 28, a second-generation British Indian who is an asset manager specializing in corporate governance. "You have the public opinion underground, and then staged public opinion in the media."

The existence of a Muslim middle class in the U.K. (and elsewehere in Europe) is no coincidence, as western institutional settings make it possible for a much larger number of people to earn a satisfactory living than they would in their home countries. So why do some agitate for political change in their home countries? Perhaps it’s because they had to emigrate in the first place; in other words, social, political, and economic institutions in their home country are poor enough to make emigration a rational choice. However, this has the effect of lowering the quality of human capital in their home countries, which perpetuates the situation. The result is an entrenched elite, a resentful majority at the bottom, and (mostly self-appointed perhaps) representatives of the downtrodden in radical clerics and jihadists. This situation is reminiscent of 19th century Russia, interestingly, and it should be apparent that Russia’s 150-plus years of political mismanagement have cost the world dearly.

Although western institutions offer the surest path to peace and prosperity, an article from The First Post illustrates that they are far from perfect, and prone to serious errors in global affairs. The article is meant as a warning about recent electoral trends in Turkey– 

"A new generation of politicians is aiming to Islamise the state by stealth. The AKP – Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party – has a stranglehold on Turkey for the foreseeable future."

–and one of the important observations is that Turkey’s membership in the EU is contingent, among other things, on "a key condition imposed by the EU [which] is the army’s abrogation of political authority – which suits the AKP just fine, for the military is the greatest barrier to Islamisation." [emphasis added] To illustrate what a glaring institutional error this is, we turn to economist Reuven Brenner, who wrote in The Force of Finance:

"Modern Turkey is another good example [of a democracy that is not thriving]…Here is a country that is democratic on paper, but that, since Kemal Ataturk’s times, has been dominated by political parties that are tightly controlled by self-perpetuating elites…Turks consistently rate the military as the country’s most trusted institution. They credit it with preventing the country from lapsing into chaos or falling under religious rule…in a democracy such as Turkey’s, such a role for the army is understandable. Its occasional intervention does not necessarily imply the same thing that it does in a country with open capital markets."

The institutional gap between states and regions of the world is one of the great riddles of modern statesmanship, one that we don’t have a pithy answer to. We simply think it’s important to realize that the best answers will be found somewhere between two extremes: (1) propping up insular and corrupt regimes and (2) radical and religious populism. On that first count, support of closed governments and defective institutions is often pursued by western governments in the name of regional stability, but it should be clear that this is not a reliable path to long term peace and prosperity. On the second, religious radicalism is likely to undermine the effectiveness of radical populism. The latter is a means for improving, in the here and now, the lot of people who have been shut out of political and economic instutions, while religious radicalism tends to promise eased suffering in the hereafter, while establishing its own worldy and well insulated elites. There are compelling arguments to be made for a renewed populism in the middle east, but if they are overly secularized by radical Islamic or any other divisive views, they will remain marginalized. A radical populism aimed at improving the overall well-being of a society can be palatable and even beneficial; merely turning the tables on perceived oppressors, although it may offer immense short term gratification, is not. 

As far as closing the gaps goes, the world is getting there, slowly and haltingly. Modern and postmodern states and economies are a very novel experiment in the span of human existence, after all. And with all due respect for the national debt mongers our there, this is likely to offer the greatest challenges, risks, and rewards to our children and grandchildren.

8/9/2007 – It came to my attention yesterday that a negative op-ed on the AKP was published in the Wall Street Journal on July 30th, which might indicate that an information or disinformation (depending on which side you’re on) campaign is taking place. It’s always fun to puzzle over the likely players and interests at work…